**TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- 8TH PLENARY SESSION MINUTES 28 FEBRUARY-2 MARCH 1994**

**MINUTES OF THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION Eighth Plenum of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs Monday, 28 February 1994**

The session convened at 08:30 A.M. in the Pentagon, Room 1E801, Conference Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

*Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Co-Chairman USRJC:* "General, I'm very glad to welcome you to Washington. Many times throughout my diplomatic career I've been a guest of you and your fellow countrymen in Moscow. Now, I finally have a chance to return some of the hospitality you have shown me and my American colleagues. As you know from your schedule, we have prepared a very full and interesting program for you in Washington, thanks in large part to the efforts of my colleagues at the Pentagon, Norm Kass and Dick Barnes. We plan to keep you busy throughout the coming week. [laughter]

"This week, General, you will have an opportunity to observe first-hand how we Americans live and work. During the Cold War, citizens of both of our countries developed prejudices about each other. These negative stereotypes often bore little semblance to reality, but nevertheless caused us to think of each other as enemies. I hope that this visit will help to dispel some of those lingering prejudices and allow you to think of Americans as friends. This transition in thinking may prove more difficult for some of you than others. As you can imagine, this did not come easy for me, after my years of service in Moscow at the height of the Cold War. But I am certain that by the end of this week, you will at least have a deeper understanding of how profoundly committed the American people and the American government are to determining the fate of our missing servicemen.

"As you know, General, in recent days a certain unpleasantness has crept into our relations. I hope you will agree that this should have no impact at all on our work. And I hope that we will continue to cooperate with each other as we have in the past.

"I am very happy with the progress the Joint Commission has enjoyed in recent months. Since last September, our efforts have been infused with a new momentum. You may recall that during our opening plenary in December in Moscow, I noted rather sharply that I and my fellow commissioners were unhappy with our failure to establish a mechanism to maintain our cooperation between our meetings. I was speaking honestly then and am speaking honestly now when I say that the situation has improved dramatically. I thank you for agreeing to my proposal that Colonel Parr, the head of our team at the American Embassy in Moscow, be permitted to have direct contact with the Russian co-chairmen of the Korean War, Cold War and Vietnam War working groups. This arrangement has allowed us to explore specific issues in much greater depth than was previously possible. I am now confident that our joint research continues smoothly between our plenary sessions.

"We are grateful to you, General Volkogonov, and to the GRU for providing us in December with documents from the 7-volume study on American military tactics during the Vietnam War. As Congressman Peterson will note during the Vietnam working group session, those documents may prove to be extremely useful in resolving some of the mysteries surrounding several cases of American MIAs. I would also like to express our gratitude to the Ministry of Defense for providing us in September the documents on shootdowns of United States aircraft in Vietnam. Together with the GRU study, this information has allowed us to make more progress on Vietnam War POWs since September than we had made during the entire previous life of the Joint Commission.

"The GRU study is also important for symbolic reasons. For several months, we had asked to receive POW-related information from that study but were told, rather unconvincingly, that it did not exist. By providing this information to us in December, you demonstrated the willingness of Russian national security officials to assist us in pursuit of our strictly humanitarian objectives.

"As I have said repeatedly, General, we have no interest in gathering information on the conduct of your

intelligence operations. We seek only concrete information on our missing servicemen. I am convinced that much of that information lies within the archives of Russia's intelligence services. It is therefore critical that we establish a mechanism to provide us with information on American POWs without compromising your legitimate security concerns. Our receipt of the 7-volume GRU study marks a key step in developing such a mechanism.

"Your recent visit with Colonel Parr to the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense in Podolsk is also an important step forward. We welcome your openness in responding to our request that Colonel Parr examine several still-classified documents related to American POWs. Maintaining such access to the Podolsk and Gatchina archives is critical to the success of our efforts. We recognize that our researchers cannot be given free reign to roam about your sensitive archives. Nor should they monopolize your archivists' time by making broad requests to see all documents relating to a particular historical period. But we do ask for your continued openness at Gatchina and Podolsk whenever our researchers have developed specific questions whose answers we believe may lie within those two archives. I was happy to hear of your offer to allow Colonel Parr to visit Podolsk again in the near future. I hope we can develop a similar procedure for access to the Naval Archives in Gatchina.

"I am also very pleased with the progress we have been making in our Korean War and Cold War working groups. We welcome the important information you have provided us in these areas in recent months. Congressman Johnson and DIA Chief of Staff Clift are again well prepared to discuss a range of specific issues. Let me at this point, General, introduce a new U.S. commissioner, Mr. Stephen Pifer of the Department of State, who will be working with Congressman Johnson in the Korean War working group. Mr. Pifer has a great deal of experience on Russian affairs, and is currently serving as the Principal Deputy to the Secretary of State's Special Adviser on the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. Mr. Pifer replaces Richard Kauzlarich, who has been nominated to be our next Ambassador to Azerbaijan. I wish him luck.

"I would like to reiterate what I have said many times before -- namely, that the work of our Joint Commission is a two-way street. We, of course, expect you to do whatever you can to help us account for missing American servicemen. But at the same time, we are fully committed to doing all that we can to determine the fate of missing Soviet soldiers. This is our shared humanitarian duty.

"In April of 1993, you asked for our assistance in locating the graves of 10 Soviet air technical personnel buried on the territory of Alaska during World War II. You indicated to our Embassy in Moscow that you believed these persons were buried in military cemeteries in Nome and Fairbanks, Alaska. I am pleased to inform you that we have located the graves of nine of those individuals in the Allied section of the Fort Richardson National Cemetery in Anchorage, Alaska. Each grave has a marble tombstone inscribed with Russian names in Latin letters. These graves have been decorated with Soviet and now Russian flags every year on Memorial Day, the holiday on which Americans honor their fallen soldiers. I am told that each body is buried with records in sealed metal canisters. If you so desire, we are ready to assist you in repatriating those remains.

"Today, I would like to present you with photographs of those graves. Please accept them as another concrete sign of our deep commitment to helping you to resolve the fate of your missing service personnel. I look forward to similar breakthroughs regarding graves of unaccounted for American servicemen, such as Captain Dunham and others.

"We are also continuing our research for further information on the Soviet GOLF-Class submarine that sank in the Pacific Ocean on March 8, 1968. You may have seen an article in the February 7 edition of the *New York Times* describing the efforts of the U.S. Navy's HALIBUT submarine to explore the wreckage of the Soviet vessel. We have formally requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff investigate this story and provide us with any additional information that may exist on the Soviet submarine. We will, of course, immediately pass on to you any such information that may arise from this investigation.

"Before yielding the floor to you, General, with your permission, I would like to call on my congressional colleagues."

*General-Major Dmitrii Volkogonov, Co-Chairman USRJC:* [Nods in agreement.]

*Toon:* "Senator Smith from New Hampshire and a Republican. But despite that he's a nice guy.

*Senator Robert Smith, Commissioner:* "Thank you, Ambassador. I was about to say you gave a nice opening statement, but I will say it anyway. I would like to thank those in the administration of President Clinton who have continued to pursue the answers on missing American POWs, both in Moscow and in Washington.

"Personally, it is a pleasure to see General Dmitrii Volkogonov present with us today. As always, I extend to you my best wishes for your continued good health, and I congratulate you on your election to the new Parliament.

"As you know, General, we first met in Moscow in February of 1992. Together we worked, along with Senator Kerry, to create this Commission which has now been doing its work for two full years. There have been rumors on both sides that perhaps the Commission may be winding down. I hope that is not the case. There is much work still to be done on this issue.

"You and I last discussed the status of our Commission's work during a meeting in my Senate office in June of 1993. Since that time, there have been two formal Commission meetings in Moscow. While I was unable to attend those meetings, I want to assure you I have thoroughly read the transcripts of those meetings.

"There are several Russian officials here today whom I have not had the opportunity to meet before, although I certainly know you, General Volkogonov, and Colonel Osipov. To everyone, I extend a warm welcome to Washington, on behalf of the United States Senate, and I look forward to successful meetings this week. If Russian officials are meeting in the Pentagon, the Cold War is truly over. You have entered a place where the vast majority of American citizens have never been.

"There are three recent developments that I would like to briefly address in my opening remarks.

"The first is in regard to President Yeltsin, the Duma and its authority relative to the Joint Commission. As Ambassador Toon has mentioned, we are pleased that you are continuing to head the Commission on the Russian side. However, we understand that because of current Russian laws, the legal basis for your authority on the Commission now comes from the Duma and not President Yeltsin. Because of this development, there is some concern and speculation that your authority to gain complete access to GRU and KGB documents has diminished. We know of your close relationship with President Yeltsin, and so we wonder if we can still count on the strong support of President Yeltsin when difficulties or roadblocks are encountered. We all recall the very public commitments to the American people that President Yeltsin made during his address to Congress in June of 1992. Perhaps you could share with us the extent that this matter was discussed during the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Moscow last month.

"The second point is the position of your Foreign Ministry on Vietnam documents. Many on our side are very concerned about whether there is now an understanding or agreement between the Russian and Vietnamese Foreign Ministries not to declassify and release to our side GRU or KGB intelligence information on U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War without prior consultation with Vietnamese officials. I am aware of the comments that you made to Ambassador Toon in December regarding this matter, but I am still concerned, in view of the fact that a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry sits on the declassification committee and surely has input into what will be released to our side.

"A further concern is based on the public statement made by your Russian Ambassador in Vietnam on September 22, 1993. You may recall, he publicly apologized for the release of the '1205' and '735' documents. He also expressed the hope that the release of this 'unreliable information' -- those are his words -- would not be allowed to adversely affect the process of normalization of relations between Washington and Hanoi. I was shocked by this statement because I believe personally that relations with Hanoi will improve only when those related documents are put on the table, analyzed and thoroughly

discussed with our former adversaries. As you know, our Commission works on a humanitarian basis and should be separate from political issues.

"During my first meeting with you in February of 1992 at your office in the Russian White House, you mentioned the case of an American helicopter which had been shot down over North Korea in 1963. At the time, you told Senator Kerry and me that the documents you had examined indicated that the North Koreans had originally told the United States that they knew nothing about the incident. Simultaneously, however, North Korea informed the Soviet Union that both of the pilots had been captured alive.

"Then, during the December of 1992 meeting of this Commission, you informed one of my investigators that we should visit the War Museum in Pyongyang for more information on POWs and MIAs from the Korean War. In America, we would call that an outstanding tip, a lead, because that museum did exist, and I personally visited it. These are pictures from that museum of the helicopter incident which you had referenced. [hands over photographs] The two Americans in that picture were held for more than one year in North Korea and then released to the United States following protracted negotiations. This case is resolved.

"But my point, General, in bringing this up, even though it was resolved, is that you did not hesitate to share with us information which showed that both Communist North Korea and the old Communist Soviet Union had indeed lied to the United States in their original denials of having information about the fate of these pilots.

"Last April, we received the '1205' document on Vietnam, and at the time, you told us that this information was shared with and accepted by the Communist Politburo of the Soviet Union, and it was held back from the U.S., at the time. Now we are told the POW information is inaccurate, although there is no evidence to prove that the Soviet Politburo did not believe the information was indeed accurate. One would wonder why a matter this serious would not have been questioned by Politburo members at the time if there was truly any doubt.

"You know that the Vietnamese were very upset with you when you released those documents, nonetheless you stated that this is a humanitarian matter, and that we are talking about men's lives. I commend you for saying those words.

"The question to you, General, and to your side is: is there currently an understanding between the Russian and Vietnamese Foreign Ministries on the matter of declassifying this or any other Vietnam-era intelligence reports in your archives, and if so, what is that understanding?

"The third and final point in my statement concerns the report of the *New York Times* dated February 18, 1994. This article reports that someone in our State Department may have improperly conveyed an impression to the Russian Foreign Ministry that no more Vietnam-era documents should be released because this might adversely affect the development of our relations with your country and our relations with Vietnam. I personally believe the opposite: the release of more documents would help to heal the wounds of war by getting answers for the families from both sides.

"General, I'm not a diplomat. I've travelled to North Korea, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and to your country, but the most productive meetings I've had have been the ones where we speak with frankness and candor.

"Colonel Osipov, who is here today, was mentioned in the *New York Times* report. I would ask if you could clarify today whether what the report said was true. Ambassador Lord from our State Department has said that any person having made such a comment would be fired. I have also written to Secretary of State Christopher asking for further information on these matters. Therefore, I hope that your side will clear up this issue today.

"I would ask Colonel Osipov:

1) why you felt compelled to raise this matter with Task Force Russia last November, and

2) if it was accurate, who spoke to him from the Foreign Ministry and expressed this concern? Or were you mistaken? Or was there a misunderstanding? What reason did you have to doubt the commitment of the State Department to seek more Vietnam-era information?

"General, in conclusion. I know I've raised some very delicate matters here. And I do not want to lose sight of the fact that this Commission has made remarkable progress since you and our side helped create it two years ago. This progress would not have been possible without you and all of your colleagues sitting at this table. As you have said before, we are talking about men's lives, and we will be judged by future generations according to what we do here. This is a window of opportunity which we must get through before it closes. Thank you."

*Toon:* "General, before yielding the floor to you to respond to the number of questions that have been raised by Senator Smith, I would like to call upon my congressional colleagues, Congressmen Peterson and Johnson, for their comments. But, before doing that, let me make a couple of comments on what the Senator said.

"With regard to the so-called 'deal' between the Russian Foreign Office and Hanoi that the Senator mentioned, I personally am persuaded by our exchange in December that there was no 'deal.' I hope that in your comments, you will be able to satisfy the Senator's concern.

"With regard to the *New York Times* article concerning a possible statement by State Department officials that we find the release of information concerning POWs somewhat damaging to our interests with Hanoi, I share the position of Winston Lord who denies this. But, again, I hope that in your reply your comments on the Senator's remarks will relieve his concerns.

"Now I would like to call upon Congressman [Pete] Peterson."

*Congressman Pete Peterson, Commissioner:* "Thank you, Ambassador Toon.

"I want to welcome my Russian colleagues to the United States. I cannot help but comment, my colleague, Senator Smith, had the distinction of serving in the House of Representatives and now in the Senate. He remembers, I'm sure, that in the House, with our higher number, we have fewer minutes to speak. With the legacy of the House on my shoulders, I will be very brief.

"I want to follow up on what Ambassador Toon said about the remarkable, constructive progress that we've made as a team. I think the strength is in the personal relations that have been established between the working group members. The trust and respect that have become a mutual part of our relationships have made them very effective working groups. I look forward to making additional breakthroughs in the Vietnam working group, comparable to what we established in December.

"As we approach our work in this session, I think it's important for us all to remember that we're dealing with history. I think it's important to remember this because of the very rapidly changing conditions we have in the present. As a commission, we should seize the rapid changes in the present condition of the world to enhance our work to discover the historical aspects of our work.

"I look forward to our meetings throughout the week and I hope that we can be as good a host as you have been for our visits in Moscow."

*Toon:* Congressman [Sam] Johnson.

*Congressman Sam Johnson, Commissioner:* "Thank you, Ambassador.

"I, too, would like to welcome you to Washington and say that, since I did not get any coffee this morning, we're talking too long and I'm going to be very brief.

"I echo what Congressman Peterson said about the camaraderie that's been established between our working groups. As a matter of fact, Colonel Orlov and I had an opportunity to visit at dinner last night and he told me that the MiG ejection seat was better than [that of] our F-86s. Of course, I disagree. But he and I agreed that there are still many uncovered leafs in the book. We need to find the answers.

"He and I believe, and as I brought up at the last plenary, that China holds the key to answering many of the Korea questions, as well as some of the Vietnam questions. I feel that we, as a commission, should push, through both our governments, to involve the Chinese to find answers for us. I look forward to getting into some of these questions with you.

"Thank you.

*Toon:* "I should point out, General, that Congressman Johnson is one of the world's great experts on ejection seats.

"General, according to the program, we're supposed to have a break at 10:30. It's almost 10:30 now, and I suggest, with your permission that we take a break. I apologize for taking so much time.

[Break]

*Volkogonov:* "I'm very happy, on behalf of the Russian side, to greet our American colleagues at this, our eighth commission meeting. I would like, in particular, to extend my warmest greetings to Malcolm Toon for his work, and to Senator Smith and Congressmen Peterson and Johnson. Please give my regards to Senator Kerry. I would also like to welcome our new member, Mr. Pifer, from the State Department.

"Before answering Senator Smith's questions and presenting my point of view, I would like to introduce the Russian members of the Commission. I will start with Professor Vladimir Kozlov who is the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Delegation and Deputy Chief Archivist of Russia. General Yurii Ivanovich Kalinin is head of one of the directorates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Issues on camps and gulags are resolved through him. He cooperates with us very well. Colonel Viktor Mukhin of the Ministry of Defense is the Deputy Archivist in the Historical-Archival Center. Military matters are in his hands. Vyacheslav Mazurov is a representative of foreign intelligence. He has been with us all along. Professor Aleksandr Orlov is a military historian from the Ministry of Defense. Colonel Osipov is the secretary of the Russian side of the Commission and my assistant. Anatolii Volkov is in charge of a small office in the Ministry of Defense which assists the President of the Russian Federation. Tatyana Koltovich is the secretary in our delegation. She does much of the technical work. General Krayushkin [senior representative of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation] could not come. He is in counter-intelligence. I regret that he could not come because of medical problems. It will be possible to meet with him in Moscow, though, as Colonel Parr knows.

"I would like to make some remarks and express our view. This may clarify some of the questions which you have raised.

"We are meeting at a time when Russian-American relations are undergoing a test of stability. We are proceeding from the fact that our Commission is working in a humanitarian area. This humanitarian aspect can help maintain and develop our relations. As a member of the Russian Parliament, I can say that Russia is undergoing a difficult period. To a certain degree, further democratic developments are being pressured by those who do not agree with today's reform-minded leadership. However, I can say, and I am convinced of this, that today's leadership is capable of not only maintaining, but also capable of developing our good relations in the right direction, in accordance with the declarations made in Vancouver and Moscow. I would like to say that we have established very good relations with the American side of the Commission in Moscow headed by Colonel Parr.

"I would also like to say that the example of your concern for missing American citizens on the territory of the former Soviet Union is not only of national significance, but goes beyond. Eleven countries have followed your example and turned to Russia with requests for help in searching for their missing fellow

countrymen. Moreover, Russia has established a commission to search for Russian citizens, then Soviet citizens, missing after World War II. This is the first instance since the 1917 October Revolution that the Russian government has been concerned about the fate of its missing countrymen.

"Before expressing how we view what is left to be accomplished and what we have accomplished, I would like to answer several questions which were posed to me as the Chairman of the Russian side of the Commission.

"I completely agree with the idea expressed today that humanitarian problems should not be politicized. Moreover, history is very close to politics, but it remains history not politics.

"Concerning the work of the Commission, the Russian side has never brought up the matter of limiting or terminating the Commission's work. Our principle is that as long as unresolved questions remain, we must work until they are resolved.

"The second issue is the status of the Russian side of the Commission. The Commission is not a parliamentary commission, but rather a presidential commission. After the old parliament was disbanded last year in September, the President issued an edict on October 21, 1993. In the edict, the President gives us authority which is definitely related to the search for missing Americans on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In particular, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Foreign Intelligence Service and the State Archival Services are to provide all possible assistance to the Commission in searching for foreign citizens."

*Toon:* "What's the date of that decree?"

*Volkogonov:* "October 21, 1993. Since the old parliament was disbanded and in order to give our side of the Commission legal authority, the edict has the force of law. It confirms our authority and indicates the agencies which must support and assist us. Therefore, there should be no doubt as to our authority and resources for carrying out our mission of searching for missing Americans and other foreign citizens.

"Third, the question was raised today about well-known, so-called 'Vietnamese' documents. I want to confirm once again that what our Commission has done is absolutely correct. All of our documents undergo a declassification process. Today I will provide you with a group of documents which have completed this routine process. Not everyone agrees with this decision, as would be the case in any society. Nevertheless, we will henceforth pass any information concerning American and foreign POWs which have a humanitarian value. This decision should be the Commission's decision. We do not intend to consult with the Vietnamese or to any other country with respect to what we may and may not turn over. We intend to continue declassifying documents, but they must undergo the declassification process in which various agencies are involved: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Security, Foreign Intelligence Service.

"As concerns the American helicopter which was shot down in Korea in 1963, Senator Smith was correct when he said that the former Soviet government hid information which it had at its disposal in 1963. Though you can blame the preceding government, there is no blame to be addressed to our Commission: we already handed this document, which is signed by Gromyko, over to you. Similarly, we will hand over such documents to the American side of the Commission. As far as the Politburo's activities, we believe that to be history. Those people died quietly in their sleep and unfortunately we cannot ask them any questions. We can only say that we do not agree with the activities of the former leadership.

"In one form or another, the issue of bilateral relations is raised: Russia and Vietnam, and the United States and Vietnam. You will agree with us that neither your work nor our work should harm other countries. We believe that all the humanitarian issues should be made public by us and that they should not be subject to secrecy.

"The question was raised whether the issue of American POWs was brought up at the two presidential

meetings. I can only say that the evening before the meeting, I was asked for information on work conducted by the Commission. I gave this information to the President. I can only say, for my part, whenever I meet with the President, and this happens regularly, he often asks me about the work of the Commission and if any new documents have been found or if any new breakthroughs have been made.

"Concerning Colonel Osipov's inquiry to Colonel Parr, Colonel Osipov only verbally gave his personal opinion of how he sees the handing over of 'Vietnam' documents. In the American press, they published a document which came from the American Embassy, not from Colonel Osipov. We should not be discussing what is sent to Washington by the American Embassy. Colonel Osipov simply made the statement that everything that can be declassified will be provided.

"During the months since the last plenary meeting the Russian side of the Commission and our American colleagues have moved ahead considerably. I would like to speak of several cases.

"We have established the precise burial site of the American pilot who died in 1953 near Yurii Island. We have talked about handing over the personal effects of the pilot. The exact location of the burial site on Yurii Island will be disclosed to the American side today. So, the burial site of Captain Dunham is known precisely and therefore it is the American side 's decision whether or not to exhume the remains. If not, then a proper monument can be placed at the site. We will hand all of this over to you. The island is small, but the burial site is clearly marked.

"As was mentioned, Colonel Parr, Colonel Mukhin and I visited the military archives in Podolsk. We were introduced, in general, to all the information related to the Korean War. We also plan to hand over to you a whole set of documents and nomenclature plates from downed aircraft. The Chief of Staff wants us to do this. Colonel Parr knows that these documents were highly classified because they contain lessons learned from the Korean War. There is a document here, which we saw with Colonel Parr, which is a survey based on information obtained by the Korean Peoples' Army and Chinese volunteers on the work with American POWs. This document contains many names. There are dozens of names of POWs which can be compared with names in your documents. These documents will be handed over to you today as well.

"Concerning the Vietnam War, Professor Kozlov can expound his views in greater detail during the working group sessions. I can say that we have discovered new documents. Not all of them have been declassified, but we brought some of them with us to show you. These are presumably parts of aircraft shot down in Vietnam. Previously, we had discussed the transfer of planes from Korea, but here we have information on planes from Vietnam. Unfortunately, there is no specific information on POWs, but these parts do have identification numbers. In any case, I think that this is new information and will allow us to move ahead."

*Peterson:* "May I interrupt? Just a question as to the location of those parts: in Russia or Vietnam?"

*Volkogonov:* "This will be discussed during the working groups; however, the planes were shot down over North Vietnam. Aviation design bureaux in the Soviet Union were interested in the construction of these planes. The next step is to determine the fate of the pilots of these planes. I would like to stress again that not all these documents have been declassified and that this work must continue. We have just started.

"Ten days ago Colonel Osipov and Colonel Parr made a special trip to Krasnodar in southern Russia. There was an allegation that American citizens were buried there. The source stated that there were possible American POWs from Vietnam. Fedorenko, the person who signed the letter, refused to meet with Colonels Parr and Osipov. We requested the local authorities to check for grave markers with English-sounding names. I regret that we did not receive a positive answer. Therefore, this allows us to assume that it may have been either disinformation or routine obscurantism.

"I regret to say that we have almost exhausted our archival possibilities with respect to the Cold War. We believe that the search for eyewitnesses and participants of specific incidents holds some promise. We

will hand over a list with the names and addresses of some of them to the American side today.

"I believe that the following document will be of some methodological interest. I personally discovered some documents concerning talks between Khrushchev and Mao Tse- tung with the personal corrections of Stalin with regard to the aircraft shot down near Lejpaya. These are Stalin's corrections in his own handwriting which present a picture of how the former Soviet leadership presented such facts. This is a historical document in Stalin's own handwriting. These were private conversations between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung concerning the plane that was shot down and what to do with information about the personnel. This piece of documentation provides an important methodological and historical hint as to how such matters were treated by Communist leaders. I believe this will be of historical interest, and it will be handed over to the American side. More will be said in the working group sessions.

"I presume that it can be said that our Commission has done work in all directions. At the same time, it is clear that we cannot give information on certain issues. For example, as before we are not able to confirm nor deny the claims of the mass media that American POWs were sent from Korea to the Soviet Union. We did some additional searches in psychiatric hospitals in certain locations. We once again looked at the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and foreign intelligence, but found no new information. The logic and way of thinking of the former Soviet leadership do not exclude such a thing from happening, but there is no concrete evidence.

"We have so far not been able to establish the burial site for the remains of Captain Posa, but the work continues.

"At the last meeting, the American side posed a number of specific questions on specific persons who disappeared in Southeast Asia in the 60's and 70's. With the help of General Kalinin from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there was much work done in a search for specific names which you had passed to us. What did we manage to find? In the archives, we found thirteen similar sounding names; however, we cannot confirm conclusively that these are people you are searching for. We clarified the fate of these 13 people. For example, there was a question about Gerber, Daniel. We found a Daniel Gerber. We discovered his fate and we can say where and how he died. We will give you documents today. Also, Miller, Karl. We found information on him. We will give you documents on him. I believe that during the working groups, this will be studied in detail, name by name. This was a great deal of work done in our archives. Several persons worked on this for a long period of time.

"I will not touch upon any other specific cases, but in conclusion I would like to say: We believe that searches should be continued. It would be good to have a specific goal. For example, perhaps by the end of the year a joint, signed document or communique with attachments could be prepared. We think that it would be useful if at the end of the Commission's work -- perhaps at the end of the year, depending upon how the American side views this -- we publish all the documents in a conditional 'white' book with appropriate comments from both the American and Russian sides.

"Lastly, as you know we are searching for Russian citizens who have disappeared after World War II. The example of the American side played a certain role in this. The American side thoroughly and diligently concerns itself with the fate of its fellow countrymen. I will repeat that since October of 1917 there has been no commission of this sort which searched for Soviet citizens in the former Soviet Union. We are grateful to the American side for information on sunken submarines and missing aircraft. There has been a positive response from Russian society.

"We have prepared two notes addressed to Mr. Christopher and Mr. Woolsey, with a request to help clarify the fates of several individuals, submarines and ships which disappeared under unclear circumstances. We would be extremely thankful to the American side of the Commission if you would pass these notes on and pass us any information on these incidents.

"Let me again say that we view the work of the Commission as a very important, humanitarian element of Russian-American relations. We sincerely hope that the Commission's work will turn out to be an element which strengthens our mutual relations.

"Mr. Ambassador, let me hand over these two letters for Messrs. Christopher and Woolsey. Of course, you will acquaint yourself with their contents. Here are the documents which I mentioned related to the search for missing American citizens in several parts of the Soviet Union, and not only the Soviet Union. Here are also documents which indicate precisely where, under what circumstances and when these planes were shot down. We would like to pass these to the esteemed Mr. Ambassador. [hands over documents] apologize for not having been as brief as Congressman Peterson and Congressman Johnson; however, I tried to say what is important for the work of our Commission."

*Toon:* "Thank you very much, General. We will of course turn these documents over to Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Christopher and report back to you as soon as we have any information. Our people in the working groups will examine very carefully the other documents that you turned over.

"Before asking my colleagues for their comments on your presentation, I would like to put one question to you. As you know, General, I've always felt that the question on the transfer of American POWs to Soviet soil was so important in our relations that it had to be decided by the Politburo. If in fact transfers of this sort did actually take place, there must be a record of these decisions in the Politburo archives. Are you satisfied, first of all, that you have had access to all of the Politburo records? And secondly, can you express a view on whether or not Politburo archives have been destroyed?"

*Volkogonov:* "I can say that I have had practically complete access to any document in the former Party Archives. Moreover, sensational documents such as the files on Katyn and the minutes of German-Soviet meetings, Molotov-Ribbentrop, I have opened with my own hands. These are documents which were hidden for decades. The Presidential Archives are working archives [i.e., active governmental archives with special access regimin]; professors and students who would like to work there cannot be admitted. Professor Kozlov, Colonel Osipov and I have worked there for a long time.

"You are right that such issues could not have been decided without the Politburo. For example, I have a document dated 20 June 1955, meeting of the Politburo. It is a so-called 'special folder' with the highest level of classification. It concerned convicted foreign citizens on Soviet territory. It was signed by Molotov and other high-ranking persons. It lists foreign citizens who at that time were in prisons: persons from the U.S., England, France, Pakistan, Denmark, Norway, Syria, and so forth. One hundred seventy-seven persons were to be repatriated and one hundred nine were to remain in prisons and camps. Here, we have decisions made by the Central Committee of the CPSU on specific persons from specific countries. We have already passed these documents to you. These documents were never intended for anyone else because the only one permitted to open a 'special folder' was the General Secretary. Therefore, I believe that this very reliably represents how this matter was handled.

"On the other hand, I cannot guarantee that some documents were not destroyed in the past, all the more since I am aware that several important documents were subject to review in the 90's by special services. I do not know whether some documents were removed because in the past I was not allowed access to these documents. I can only say that in the last few months I personally met, on orders from the President, with the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Mr. Primakov, with the Minister of Internal Affairs, General ***, and with the leader of the Counter-Intelligence Services, General Golushko, and asked them for assistance in these matters. I also met with the Chief of the General Staff, General-Colonel Kolesnikov, with the same request. They assured me that any information at their disposal concerning American POWs and other foreign citizens would be presented to me.

"For example, you expressed a desire to visit the museum of an air defense unit that was connected with shoot-downs of American aircraft. I conferred with the Chief of the General Staff and, yes, you may visit the museum. As far as the archives in Gatchina are concerned, there is no question that you will be able to go there to work. I want you to believe that on the part of the Commission there is a sincere desire to create an atmosphere of trust."

*Toon:* "As you know, General, I've always been convinced that as far as your personal efforts are concerned, we have no complaint. And I think that also applies to President Yeltsin. I wish everybody in Russia felt the same way.

"I would like to call on my colleagues for any questions that they might have."

*Smith:* "A couple of brief questions, General. First, did you bring with you today the complete text of the so-called '735 document?'"

*Volkogonov:* "No. In the documents which we handed over to you today there is nothing new on this issue. This part of the document has not been declassified yet, and I can assure you that there is no information on POWs, and it has nothing to do with individuals. It deals exclusively with operational, strategic and military issues. I have read this document several times and can tell you on my honor there is nothing that would help us in our work. We gave Colonel Parr the opportunity to read the document. He could not make a copy, but he could have written down anything of importance."

*Smith:* "I just have one comment that I would like to conclude on: there seems to be an inconsistency -- not in anything you said, but conceptually -- about a point that you made about third country harm. If by releasing a document we find out information of a humanitarian nature, such as information on missing service personnel, and that inadvertently harms a third-party country, what is the decision that your side would make?

*Volkogonov:* "I believe that humanitarian issues connected with the rights and fates of people are of the highest value that there is on this earth. There are no situations which could justify keeping silent about such a document. I can assure you that if I knew of a document connected with the secret fate of Americans, I would consider it unprofessional on my part not to make it public. These are issues common to all mankind.

"I do not have the right to give you advice, but I believe that answers to your questions are not only in Moscow, but also, to a large degree, in Hanoi, Peking, and possibly in Pyongyang. I think that it may be possible to start work bilaterally with these countries. Even during the times of the best relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, there were a large number of areas where the receipt of information from Vietnam was impossible.

"I requested the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense prepare a list of advisors who worked in Vietnam. The list is long. You can speak with them. I spoke with many of them. They told of the bombing of Vietnam, napalm and shoot-downs. They would say that there were some pilots taken prisoner in some places. However, I did not receive any specific information, specific eyewitness testimony about specific persons."

*Toon:* "On the third-country issue, if your colleagues agree with you, then I have no concern "

*Peterson:* "I will reserve my questions for the working group. If I may add, all of the people whom we are searching for were lost under desperate situations. Again, it's important for us to focus only on their fates from a historical perspective and a humanitarian perspective and not to worry so much about whose fault and under what specific circumstances individuals may have lost their lives."

*Volkogonov:* "I fully agree with you, Congressman."

*Mr. Denis Clift, Commissioner:* "Thank you. The Russian Co-Chairman's opening statement confirms that we can expect further progress in the meeting of the Cold War working group this afternoon. When we met in December, Ambassador Toon received the ring of Captain Dunham. He said that he would return that ring to the widow of Captain Dunham as soon as possible. To contribute to your records, I would like to give you photos of the ceremony of Mary Dunham Nichols receiving the ring. I would hope that one copy might be given to the sailor, Mr. Saiko, who came forward with the ring."

[Hands over the photographs.]

*Volkogonov:* "Yes, of course, by all means. Two days ago I met with Aleksandr Yakovlev, and we agreed that when I return I will appear on television and will show this photo, which will be seen by millions of

Russian citizens. I would like to add one thing: we brought a fragment of the U-2 aircraft which was shot down over the Urals. Just as you presented us with the bell, we would like to present this fragment to you. I believe that this could be a symbol denoting all that was negative in the past we are giving up to history.

*Toon:* "Thank you for your introduction, General; we all share your sentiments. I suggest we adjourn for lunch."

**MINUTES OF THE COLD WAR WORKING GROUP Eighth Plenum of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs**

The first session of the Cold War Working Group of the 8th plenary session opened in the Pentagon office of DIA Chief of Staff Mr. Denis Clift, chairman of the U.S. side of the working group, at 1417 hours on 28 Feb 94. Participating on the American side were Mr. Clift, Colonel Mike Semenec, Major William Burkett, Dr. Jim Connell, and Major Elizabeth Checchia (notetaker), and translator Dmitrii Arensburger. For the Russian side, participants were General-Major Yurii Kalinin, General-Major Anatolii Volkov, and LTC Sergei Osipov.

Clift: "Welcome to the Pentagon, to my office. I have no long opening statement. Both sides had such statements in this morning's plenary. The U.S. side depends on the Russian side for information. Accordingly, please present your new information first. Then I would like to look at each of the cases to see where we are."

Kalinin: "Much was said this morning about friendship and cooperation. General Volkogonov has studied the documents on the Cold War thoroughly. More thorough work should be done, we should put more effort into finding live witnesses to get answers to specific questions. As to questions on camps and special prisons of the MVD, archival material shows that by order of the MVD, a document dated 21 February 48, #159 Top Secret, deals with camps for "particularly dangerous criminals." Vladimir, Aleksandrovsk, and Verkhnii Ural prisons were used to imprison spies, terrorists, and saboteurs. Tobolsk and Zlataust were also used for this. A 16 March 48 document set up 5 special purpose camps:

1) Mineral'nyi, Inta, Komi ASSR

2) Gorki

3) Dubrovnyi, Yavach, Mordovia

4) Stepnoi, Kazakhstan

5) Magadan.

"Lots of work remains to be done on-site. Plans have been made for the Commission to visit Magadan, and we could plan to visit other places. We need a joint trip to interview witnesses.

Connell: "Are records for these camps in the archives of the regional capitals?"

Kalinin: "After 1953, all material went to the KGB or the state archives. But card files are still on site. They are not well organized, and there are a lot of cards. At the meeting in December there was an interest expressed in finding people held in special camps. Foreigners were tracked in all camps. Dubrovnyi camp in Mordovia in February 48 had these foreigners. [Kalinin runs through a list of nationalities.] No Americans. It would have been impossible to conceal foreigners in these camps because records were so good. Records will show where Americans were kept."

Clift: "At the end of the last plenary, you offered to develop a plan to let our researchers review records of these camps. Today you are telling us that will be possible -- this year we will be able to visit these six camps."

Kalinin: "Five camps and five prisons."

Osipov: "You can visit any camp or prison anytime. Just make the arrangements."

Clift: "COL Semenec will be replacing COL Parr. He will be setting up these visits with you."

Kalinin: "We will do our utmost to make the work intensive. All it takes is more energetic activity."

Clift: "When we come to Russia in late May or early June, Amb. Toon hopes to go to Magadan."

Kalinin: "With pleasure. I will be happy to accompany him. COL Parr has raised the question of the location of psychiatric hospitals. They were put under the control of the Ministry of Health under Gorbachev. Documents list the location of psychiatric hospitals. Preliminary work indicates no Americans were held there. But we should look at records there, too."

Osipov: "Since the last plenary, we have focused on specific U.S. requests: first, the 1965 incident; second, the burial locations of Dunham and Posa; third, the 1953 incident in the Pacific with a map of the search vessels; fourth, further work in the Presidential and other archives to find traces of the pilots of downed aircraft.

"On 1965 - the Black Sea incident: Soviet vessels salvaged parts of the downed aircraft. We are providing documents today. The Malinovsky document to the Central Committee; there are two documents. One is signed by Gorshkov, that the aircraft was lost. The second was signed by Malinovskii, that a wing and parts were salvaged and delivered to the design bureau. This occurred outside Soviet territorial waters. There is no word in these documents about the crew. The accident was on 14 December 65, the parts were salvaged on 18 December 65. The crew probably died.

"Dunham and Posa: on Capt Dunham, we were able to find a document, a certificate of 10 October 52, signed by the Commander and political officer of the border post. It states that at 10 a.m., they buried a male body, Dunham, John Robertson. The corpse was picked up on 7 October by a patrol boat in the crash area. The body was buried in a wooden coffin. There is a map attached. It was buried in a section of a Japanese cemetery."

Clift: "Thanks for following up on this case. Last April we had only a report that the body had been found. The U.S. government is very appreciative. We would like to work with you in Moscow to develop a detailed proposal for repatriation of remains."

Volkov: "Numerous problems and issues need to be discussed and resolved while we are still here. Geographically, Yurii Island is very remote. It is the nearest island to the Russo-Japanese border, 30 km from the border. The island is 20 km square, rocky, with about 25 Russians stationed there. Weather dictates our actions. We could not get there this time of year at all. Iturup Island is 90 km away. The expedition can only be done in the summer; September would be best. Gen. Baduzhe, Deputy Commander of the Russian Border Troops, has promised his assistance. We have discussed this with Gen. Nikolaev, commander of the border fleet. He also promised assistance, but it is a border area with a special regime. There are problems of ethics: what does Dunham's widow want? We are grateful that you found the burial sites of our nine fliers; we will inform their relatives, but further actions will depend on what the next of kin decide. There is a research problem: Dunham is buried in a Japanese cemetery. Finding the correct remains and identifying them may require equipment and specialists, to determine what should be removed. Everything we know is based on documents; no one has actually visited the site. This area has had several *tsunamis* [storms] and is often flooded by the sea. We only have 40-year old documents. In order not to look silly before the general public, these discussions should be held close-hold and not passed to journalists.

"Last question: how do we finance such an expedition? We must have members from the Commission, from the Border Troops, two or three representatives from special agencies, anthropologists, equipment, and a helicopter to carry nine or ten people. Food and water; this will be a real expedition. We need to

plan prior to the next plenary, then talk about the details and do it.

"In October, a Presidential Commission was formed to search for Russians lost outside the USSR and for foreigners lost inside the USSR. We will use the same techniques as you do to set up the work of the new Commission. The President has decided that this Commission should be set up like the Joint Commission. This should not interfere with the activities of the Joint Commission, but we will have new responsibilities and new rights: we will be able to contact embassies with which the U.S. does not have good contacts. The Joint Commission will remain basically unchanged, with some personnel changes. We have questions and requests for you: we would like information on the crews of our nuclear and diesel submarines lost during the Cold War. To date, we have gotten nothing from the Pentagon to share with the next of kin on submarines that were raised. We want a list of documents salvaged from the submarines, personal effects of the sailors; we want them to give to families. It is of moral and political significance and a reciprocal act for aircraft fragments that we have given you."

Osipov: "We have a piece of the U-2 for Powers' widow. But we did turn over plates from downed aircraft in N. Vietnam."

Volkov: "It was very difficult to get these fragments. We had to have a letter signed by Colonel-General Kolesnikov, Chief of the General Staff. Anything that goes into an archive is hard to remove. The Cold War involved battle on the front lines between us, but also intelligence personnel, advisors and technical experts.

"We request you help to determine the fates of our servicemen lost in Ethiopia in 1978. One of them was still alive in 1989 -- LTC Udalov. Documents will be provided. We cannot reveal our sources, but can provide you with the information. We want to compare our information with yours, but we do not care about your sources and methods. If our officer was alive for 10 years, and if, as some have reported, he is now in Somalia, you can imagine the effect.

"We request information on our MIAs/advisors 'performing their internationalist duty.' We cannot pay pensions or compensation to their widows unless we know their fates. We do not care who is to blame; all we want is confirmation that individuals died, not that they just disappeared.

"Afghanistan, a separate subject. LTC Osipov has all the information we have turned up on this subject. We have twenty men missing and families are suffering. We are not talking about the 150 the CIA told us decided to stay behind. We are talking about twenty-six to twenty-eight people whose fate is unknown.

"The battle for technology: we want one item - the Academician Aleksandrov who disappeared in Spain. He is a young, talented nuclear physicist. We have reason to believe that foreign intelligence services were involved. His wife and mother have contacted us; this issue is an open wound for the next of kin and the scientific community.

"The list of individuals is extensive. We would like some information by the next plenary."

Clift: "The work of the Commission is a two-way street. We will accept your requests in the same good faith as you accept ours. Let me go back to Capt Dunham. We should not build up false expectations, but we want to start work as soon as possible on a detailed plan for a team to go to Yurii Island and hopefully find the remains. Tomorrow you will meet Mrs. Dunham. You will be getting lots of questions from families tomorrow afternoon. Mrs. Dunham and her daughter would like the remains repatriated."

Volkov: "They have to be found first. We only have documents, not a grave."

Clift: "Let us not raise false expectations, but let us proceed. The next of kin wants us to find the remains. The Moscow office will work with you to develop a plan. We must decide financing, timing, experts, perhaps from CILHI. Concerning the submarines, Amb. Toon addressed that this morning. In December, he said he thought we had given you everything. Now we will look again and work harder. I assume that the letter for Woolsey addresses the submarines. You are getting the attention of the right officials in our

government."

Osipov: "After press reports that documents were raised from the submarine, we cannot accept an answer that nothing was found. It concerns 300 family members of the ninety-eight crew members. The only income thirty-one of these people have comes from survivors' pensions. Under our law, since we do not know the circumstances, the pension is only thirty percent of the serviceman's salary. You cannot survive on that. The pension for survivors [of servicemen] who perished on duty is fifty or seventy percent of base pay. That makes a big difference. This is purely a humanitarian effort; it does not matter why the submarine sank."

Clift: "Concerning servicemen in Ethiopia, I addressed this at the December plenary. I asked CIA to check their records. Their archivists found the 1979 report, reporting the 1978 incident in which 6 of 7 were executed. The seventh [individual] was taken to Mogadishu. This was not an active case for the CIA; I will check with them again. We will take this as a fresh request.

Osipov: "Our information says that LTC Udalov may have been alive in 1989."

Clift: "Concerning advisors who died abroad, give us your list and we will check our information.

Volkov: "Not just our advisors, but all our servicemembers, and other Soviet citizens: civil servants, doctors, technical personnel."

Clift: "Give us names.

Volkov: "We will turn over a list, but you should start looking immediately, so as not to lose time.

Clift: "On Afghanistan, our information gets less and less as time passes. But we will take your twenty-six names and look for information. Concerning Academician Aleksandrov, I have personally written a letter to my colleagues in the intelligence business asking for information. There is no answer yet."

Osipov: "Let us get back to the four points we began with:

"The fate of the remains of Posa. We have only one document. A fisherman dredged up skeletal remains. You have this document. After December, we questioned border troops, fishermen, and administrative people in Arkhangel'sk. Neither interviews nor archives have any information that the body came to land. KGB documents refer only to Posa's documents, not his body. We have not checked every border post up there, or all the intelligence records. It will take about two months. We should have the information by May, and we will work with COL Semenec. My impression is that the body was buried at sea. We may have to ask locals by TV or press - someone may remember. We didn't want to do that because of lurid facts, the condition of the corpse. But if you want us to and we exhaust every other avenue, we will do it

Clift: "Please continue your efforts. One of your documents, from Shelepin to Khrushchev, says that on 17 October the remains and parts of the plane will be delivered to Severomorsk. We must keep this as an open issue."

Osipov: "I agree. By June we should complete our archival search."

Clift: "In December, Gen. Krayushkin said you would broadcast when the time is right. Let's talk about point four."

Osipov: "I will be brief, but we will need to look at it tomorrow. Presidential Archives are the most likely to have good documents, but you cannot work there on a broad front; there is a special access regime. I got Gen. Volkogonov's permission and spent a week in that archive. I looked at all material relating to aviation. Not one document is contained in that archive that we have not seen before. Thus, we will proceed in a different way, by asking eye-witnesses instead of using documents. This is complicated, but with respect to three air incidents, we have twenty-one live witnesses. I have spoken to five of these

myself, sometimes with COL Parr. Rybakov refused to talk with Parr. I will give you my notes. Let us continue tomorrow."

Clift: "This is a very important line of inquiry. Saiko was an eye-witness. In the Armenia shootdown, our best information came from eye-witnesses. I will have questions for you tomorrow on witnesses. The agenda for tomorrow morning is agreed."

The second session of the Cold War Working Group was held again in Mr. Clift's Pentagon office on the morning of 1 March 94. Attendees were the same, with the addition on the Russian side of Commission Co-Chairman General-Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov.

Clift: "Gen. Volkogonov, thank you for joining us. Let me summarize what happened yesterday: LTC Osipov had four agenda items: 1) 1965 crash documents; 2) we discussed Capt. Dunham at length. You have a document showing place of burial, but we must advance carefully without raising false expectations; 3) we discussed where you would like our help in finding missing Russians: the Golf-class submarine, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, MIAs in general, and Academician Aleksandrov. We will take each of these items for action. Amb. Toon will convene a meeting in Washington next week to discuss these issues; and 4) the 1960 Barents Sea case - Major Posa's body."

[Osipov also said that the Presidential archives held no more information - we need to move to interviewing witnesses. Gen. Kalinin gave us an update on what his ministry had done. COL Semenec will work in Moscow with his people on camps, prisons, and psychiatric hospitals.]

Clift: "Now we must discuss the issue of the color maps of the 1953 shootdown, and archival work on search and rescue. This is also an item the families will raise today."

Osipov: "Let us talk about the color map. The map has been declassified. There is only a technical problem: there is no color copier in that archive. Gatchina says that we can photograph it."

Clift: "Gen. Volkogonov, do we have permission to go up to Gatchina and take photos?"

Volkogonov: "Yes. Let us do it."

Osipov: "Let us talk about witnesses to the ten incidents.

"First, the Reynolds case, 1950 in the Baltic. Questions from the U.S. side were to interview members of the search and rescue mission. Four MiGs shot down the plane. We found the location of three pilots: Gerasimov is in Vitebsk; Dokin died in 1951; Tizyaev is dead.

"Second, visit the border guard archives; not a state, but a departmental archive. We need the permission of Gen. Barduzhe, who controls this archive. On 23 February 94, the Russian side appealed to him for information. Little research has been done in this archive."

Clift: "In December, General Krayushkin said your side would do research in these archives on all ten cases. We still look forward to that."

Osipov: "OK, we will do it, but our first priority was finding Dunham. The Border Guards became an independent agency in December, so Krayushkin's "in" with them is gone. We need to get a new Commission member from the Border Guards."

Clift: "Let them know Amb. Toon would appreciate any help."

Osipov: "Regarding gun camera photography, Gen. Volkogonov called in all the experts in this area and asked them. Film was not preserved because it was flammable. It was used to evaluate a pilot's performance, then was destroyed. There is no film -- it was not preserved in any archive. Photos connected with the Armenian shootdown found in Podolsk were a fluke."

Clift: "On the 13 June 52 shootdown, Kuznetsov reported to Stalin that the shootdown was recorded on film. On the 18 April 55 incident, a report to Kuznetsov said there was film. The high level of that report made me hope that prints would be, perhaps, in the Presidential archives. But I accept your report today."

Osipov: "Gun cameras worked automatically. So there was film then. There are only files of incidents in the Presidential archives, and we've looked at them all. Regarding work in the Gatchina archives, at yesterday's plenary, Gen. Volkogonov gave permission for this. Col. Semenec and I will work out the details."

Semenec: "I report to DPMO on 1 April, and hope to be in Moscow in mid-April."

Osipov: "Capt. Reznikov did a thorough look at the Gatchina archives and gave us the material he found. There is nothing new -- you received copies of the documents in December. On the 8 April 50 case, we are convinced that the plane was shot down into the sea and there were no survivors. Our people do not know where it went down, so a large-scale search was mounted."

Volkogonov: "Russians considered this a valuable plane with important equipment and mounted a large search effort. We used new boats, divers, etc. The plane was not found. The technology at the time could not pinpoint the location of the crash; you could not search the whole Baltic."

Osipov: "After Gen. Volkogonov met with Mrs. Reynolds, they did an extensive search with he MVD and KGB for information on this crew. They checked for changed names or transliteration problems. They looked at prison records too, but found nothing. They also checked the psychiatric hospitals and regular hospitals and found nothing. We have exhausted all archival possibilities. Now we need to look for witnesses. The regimental commander and one pilot are still alive. The regimental commander flew up to take a look after the shootdown. We have not found him yet.

Burkett: "We also want to talk to sailors who were involved in the rescue operations."

Osipov: "Hundreds of sailors were involved. It would be hard to find the important ones."

Burkett: "There was an *Izvestiya* article in 1992 with an interview with a sailor named Savchuk, who may have some information. Rudnev wrote the article."

Osipov: "Rudnev talked to Gen. Volkogonov and me. We do not think he had any new information, but you can talk to him."

Volkogonov: "I talked to Aleksandr Yakovlev at Ostankino. In March, I will appear on TV to appeal to the public for new information. Maybe this will bear fruit. Ostankino broadcasts throughout the entire former USSR."

Osipov: "The 6 November 51 incident over the Sea of Japan. No gun camera photos exist at Gatchina. What have we established? Two LA-11s shot the plane down, Lukashev and Shchukin were the pilots. The plane crashed and there were witnesses in an observation plane. We have not found any of them yet."

Clift: "Can you do this through the pension system?"

Osipov: "No. Pensions are paid from many locations, not one central commission. If a serviceman is demobilized, it goes to the draft board (Voenkomat) in a city -- that is the only information we have. If he stays there, he will be easy to find. If he moves, it is hard to track him down. We can go to a big card file at the Ministry of Defense to look for him -- this file is from 1917 to the present. After 1941, the cards are at Podolsk; before 1941, they are at the central Army archives."

Semenec: "How many Voenkomats are there?"

Osipov: "Oblast, raion, city, thousands."

Clift: "Maybe your TV appearance will help us."

Osipov: "I have notes on each case -- I will give them to you. They have names and addresses. On the Maritime Border Guards question, we have information in the archives only filed by unit. A cutter deck log is only a temporary document. It was not preserved, except on capital ships. There are documents at brigade and division level of the Border Guards; there may be something there. But we would find information there only by coincidence, and random searches require lots of time."

Volkogonov: "Col. Semenec can get together with Col. Osipov and Gen. Volkov and work out the details "

Clift: "Let me explain why we think search and rescue logs of the border guards are important. Family members are our clients; if border guard information on searches do not mention survivors, that is a good piece of information for families."

Osipov: "It is hard to counterfeit such information. We consider this information important, but we cannot find it if it does not exist."

Clift: "In December, I provided you with information on Soviet planes shot down over Korea. I am pressing our Navy to find the ship's logs to provide more information, but they are having a hard time.

Volkov: "It is hard to compare Soviet Border Guards in the 1950s with U.S. naval forces at that time. Soviet equipment was left over from the war -- not very good. The life of the ships was very short and records were not well kept. The main responsibility was NOT with the Border Guards, but with the Navy. We are looking for deck logs in vain, and those we have found contain minimal information."

Osipov: "The 13 June 1952 incident in the Sea of Japan: two MiG-15s shot down the RB-29. The leader was Capt. Fedotov, and the wingman was Proskurin. Proskurin is still living. The 7 October 52 incident: this is the RB-29 shot down near Yurii Island. Two LA-11s shot it down. The pilots were Capts Lesnov and Zhirikov. Lesnov died in 1959, Zhirikov was living in Yevpatoriya in 1978. It is hard to track him now that Ukraine is an independent state."

Clift: "This is Dunham's flight. We have one eyewitness, Mr. Saiko."

Osipov: "Saiko said that the crash was visible from the island. There may be other witnesses. Seamen are hard to find, but officers may be easier. On our trip to Yurii Island, we covered it yesterday."

Clift: "Will you look for Zhirikov in Ukraine, or shall we?"

Volkogonov: "In one way it's easier for us, in one way easier for you. I think we should both try to do this through our own channels."

Clift: "I'd like to have at least a second witness to go with Saiko. We do not want to rely on a single source.

Volkogonov: "If we could find one, maybe we could close this case."

Osipov: "Maybe we can find the captain of the ship, but it will take more time. On the 29 July 53 case, the Sanderson case: this is the most complex case and the one we have worked on most. I gave you the interview with Rybakov. We have proof that Rybakov's plane was hit in two places. He had to make an emergency landing. We are also looking for the wingman, Yablonevski. If we find him, we will help you meet with him. There was a lot of cloud cover, but we are trying to find witnesses on the ground."

Clift: "This IS a complex case. When we were at Gatchina, you said, "The KGB is a government within a government." This case is one in which Americans feel that U.S. crew members were found in the water and taken ashore. Capt Roche survived, and was found a day later. This of all the cases would be the one

where the SVR should provide the Commission with their findings on the case. This would be useful."

Volkogonov: "Primakov is not the one you want; he did not have anything to do with that."

Clift: "Whoever it is, we need his information."

Volkogonov: "In principle, anything was possible then. The head of government would deny anyone survived and the case would be closed. We have no evidence that anyone survived, but we have to keep looking. There should have been corpses. We found two, but there should have been more. There will be a new head of the counter-intelligence services; maybe we will ave more success in the future."

Osipov: "We're not going to close this case. We should talk to Yablonevskii and continue archival research. We should also search for witnesses. Please ask your consulate in Vladivostok, and go back to the TV, radio and the press looking for information. Thousands of people should have been able to see what was going on."

Volkov: "We also want to explore the trawler in the area, but records are poor. It has been hard to find anyone assigned to that ship. We have gone to the head of the area fishing industry to find names."

Osipov: "We still need witnesses for the 17 April 55 shootdown, and for the 10 September 56 incident. In Armenia, there is no use to search further, unless the U.S. side wants us to continue.

[Amb. Toon and Mr. Bryza of the State Department enter.]

Clift: "There is an important issue concerning the 1958 Armenia incident. [Translator reads letter from Lorna Bourg.] Lorna will be there this afternoon. She wants to pursue detailed questions like these."

Volkogonov: "We have to return to Gen. Sozinov's testimony. He was at the crash site soon after the crash, and said that the plane burned for four to five hours. All remains were burned; nothing could have remained. Who is this Ramon? A Spaniard? [Refers to Mrs. Bourg's source of information in Armenia.] We have to get all the statements of the witnesses together. Cutting off the heads of corpses would be vandalism and irrational. I view this with great skepticism."

Toon: "Why did we not get this information while we were there?"

Volkogonov: "Sozinov said he could not get within 100 meters of the crash. The flames were intense; little technical analysis would be possible after such a fire."

Osipov: "If a doubt has arisen, we will go through it again."

Clift: "We will provide the final CILHI report when we receive it. Normally, I would have passed Ms. Bourg's information to our Moscow office for action, but with the family meeting oday, I wanted to let you know what might be brought up."

Osipov: "The 1 July 60, Barents Sea incident. This is a simple case, since we have to find Posa's body, but there are no traces of land burial. I have already told you what we plan to do: first, survey border guard units along the Barents Sea; second, check cemetery records in Severomorsk and Archangelsk. Third, we will survey local residents for witnesses. If that does not help, we will go on TV locally asking for help. We might contact fishermen through their veterans organizations.

"14 Dec 65 - That incident had little relationship to the USSR. Our information is based on radio and radar intercepts. We searched for fragments of the plane; these documents were given to us yesterday. There is no question of human remains. It was 150 miles from the Soviet shore."

Clift: [Summarizing for Amb. Toon] "We have gone through each incident in detail. We have agreed to look for eyewitnesses whenever we can. Col. Osipov and Col. Semenec will pursue these interviews. We

spent time discussing search and rescue units. The organization that handles such documents has changed subordination: Gen. Krayushkin no longer runs it. The new organization will help if it can. Yesterday we discussed Dunham's remains; now we must mount a carefully planned expedition. We must not build false expectations that we can just go out and pick them up. We will pass this information on to Mrs. Dunham today."

Toon: "We must ascertain what she wants."

Volkogonov: "On the map of the burial site, it is close to shore. It may have been washed over by the sea. We should give this document to our Border Guards and ask them if there is any sign of the gravesite, any marker, before we mount our expedition."

Clift: "Is the island accessible by air or boat or both?"

Volkogonov: "There should be a dock there. It is a 48-hour sail there from Vladivostok. There is no airport, but a helicopter could land. It is out of helicopter range of Vladivostok."

Semenec: "We could get there from Japan, but it is a political problem."

Clift: "General Volkogonov, you are right. Let us have the Border Guards look at the site. And let us ask the widow if she wants the remains repatriated. Then we can plan."

Volkogonov: "It will be easier and cheaper through Japan. Let us take a look first."

Clift: "I know our ambassador to Japan, Amb. Mondale, and Amb. Toon knows him, too. Later this month, Gen. Volkogonov will appear on Channel 1 to make a fresh appeal in all these cases.

Toon: "It would be useful to know how many families will be there this afternoon, and what their attitude will be "

Burkett: "Thirteen family members from the Cold War families will be there, from the following incidents: 8 April 50; 6 November 51; 13 June 52; 7 October 52; 29 July 53; 2 September 58; and maybe 1 July 60. I have spoken to most of them. They will not be confrontational, but they do want answers to their questions."

Volkogonov: "Everything we know, we will say. But neither Amb. Toon nor I bear responsibility for these incidents. We are only trying to find answers. We both want to reveal the truth. We will not be able to answer all questions. We want the Russian side's understanding of the family's pain to come through. In the past, we looked at each other through the cross-hairs. The Russian side will take every measure to get information, and we will provide all of it we find."

Toon: "Let us begin this afternoon with a short statement like the one you have just made."

**Cold War Working Group Eighth Plenum of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs** Action Items and Requests

Action Items

1. The U.S. side will be granted access and visit the five camps and five prisons upon request to COL Osipov. [CWWG Minutes, 1-2; Osipov/Kalinin]

2. Russian side will begin examination of the [pre-1988] records of the psychiatric hospitals. [1-2; Kalinin] [NB: Hospitals are now under the Ministry of Health; pre-1988 records are centrally held by MVD. MacDougall.]

3. USRJC will develop a plan for disposition of Dunham's remains. The first steps will be:

-- the U.S. side will enquire of the widow regarding her wishes on repatriation;

-- the Russian side will confirm the existence of a grave in the indicated location. Once the status of these questions is determined TFR-M will consult with the Russian side to prepare a plan of action for either repatriation or placement of a memorial. That plan will include proposals for agreement of itinerary, participants for field trip and other ceremonies, support responsibility, fiscal support, staging support, expert participation (CILHI), public affairs coordination.

4. Russian side will complete an archival search for information on disposition of Major Posa's remains by June 1994.

5. COL Osipov will provide all his notes on his interviews of witnesses (five completed to date; twenty-one total witnesses) to three air incidents. [1-7; Osipov]

6. Ambassador Toon will convene a high-level meeting to examine the Russian requests for information on Soviet losses of submarines, of personnel in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and MIAs in general, and of Academician Aleksandrov. [2-1; Clift]

7. COL Semenec and COL Osipov will work out details for the U.S. side to send a photographic team to Gatchina (TsGVMFA) to photograph the color chart detailing the 1953 shoot-down, and TFR-M will make the visit. [2-1 to 2-2; Volkogonov/Osipov]

8. The Russian side will work to gain access to the Border Guard archives under Gen.

Baduzhe, and research the ten loss cases; research will focus on brigade and divisional records of the Border Guards; COL Semenec, COL Osipov, and MGEN Volkov will negotiate the details of access and the files desired by the U.S. side. [1-1 to 1-3; Osipov/ Volkogonov]

9. Both sides will make enquiries in Ukraine (Evpatoriia) to locate Soviet pilot Zhirikov, who was involved in the Dunham shoot-down. [2-5; Osipov/Volkogonov]

10. The Russian side will continue work on the 29 July 1953 case, particularly through the security services, and will talk to Iablonevskii and search in the archives. [2-6; Osipov]

11. The Russian side will continue work on the 1 July 1960 case: (1) survey Border Guard unit files and archives; (2) check local cemetery records in Severomorsk and Arkhangel'sk; and (3) publicize the case for local information. [2-7; Osipov]

Requests

1. The U.S. side will investigate more fully the circumstances of loss of Soviet nuclear and diesel submarines, and will investigate the possibility of return of documents and personal effects recovered from lost Soviet submarines; list of loss incidents provided. [Woolsey FORAC? 1-51

2. The U.S. side will investigate more fully the circumstances of loss of Soviet personnel in Ethiopia, in particular LTC N.F. Udalov, reported alive in 1989; loss data provided.

3. The U.S. side will investigate the circumstances of disappearance of twenty-one additional servicemen listed as missing in action in Afghanistan, but not deserters; list provided.

4. The U.S. side will pursue the case of missing scientist Academician Aleksandrov, who disappeared in Spain under mysterious circumstances. [Action initiated by Clift; 1-6]

5. The U.S. side should initiate publicity through the consulate in Vladivostok on the 29 July 1953 case to identify local witnesses. [2-6; Osipov]

**MINUTES OF THE KOREAN WAR WORKING GROUP**

**Eighth Plenum of the USRJC for POW/MIA Affairs**

The Korean War Working Group convened 28 February 1994 at 14:15. Congressman Sam Johnson chaired the American Korean War Working Group. Other American members of the KWWG present were Steve Pifer of the State Department and Edward Ross, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. COL Orlov chaired the Russian Korean War Working Group. Supporting him were Colonel Aleksandr Orlov and Colonel Viktor Mukhin.

Johnson: "Let's start our meeting in an informal manner. When Orlov arrives we will go to formal. Last night I gave him two Russian names of pilots from the Korean War. We would like to talk with them. The two who shot down or who saw shot down Hal Fisher, my friend. He was captured by the Chinese. The name I got on the telephone -- I am not sure of the spelling -- was Dmitrii Yermakov, who lived near Leningrad. The other Askol'd Andreevich German. Last name German. Since they were involved in the end of the Korean War. That's when they shot down Fisher. You could ask them about the incident and if they know anything about him or about others."

Volkogonov: "I think Osipov worked on this. We could set up a meeting. Col. Parr may be interested in attending. I also requested that a list be made of people who fought in Korea, but half are dead now. We will have a more complete list in the future."

Johnson: "Second, but I don't know if we should wait for Orlov."

[Prof. Orlov arrives]

Johnson: "I gave them [Gen. Volkogonov and Col Mukhin] the two names that we talked about last night. We had long opening remarks this morning. I will just say a few words. We have a Senator, you know. I said it's a good working group because we get down to facts. I believe that you know everyone except Steve Pifer."

Pifer: "I am pleased to be a part of this group. I have worked since 1981 on Soviet/Russian relations. This group is a positive reflection of the positive direction of our relations. I hope that I can make a contribution to our efforts."

Orlov: "We'll only greet this new colleague from the State Department. We hope that cooperation will be fruitful."

Johnson: "I remember the first time I started I forgot about the interpreter. When we started with this work in 1992 we knew of a list of 8200 MIAs from the Korean War. We heard rumors of 1000's more going to Russia. Of this we have no concrete information from either side. Orlov commented at the last session that he was glad that we had reduced the number to 2220. I think that the fact that we are talking together about a war we were both involved in is n important part of history. Now is the time to concentrate on the small numbers, to see what we can find, and to see if we can find new archival holdings. As an example, I've mentioned the three divisions in China and it seems to me that these units should also have archives, not solely of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps [64FAC]. I'm not aware where their records might be kept; you should tell us. Indications are that maybe some were transferred to the Soviet Union. My belief after talking with Fisher -- I know him as he was in my unit -- is that he and I concluded that based upon how you received information from the Chinese, that the Chinese probably have most of the answers. I think that you are here in the U.S. and we're working on the same goals; we're grateful for your efforts. I would like to fly that F-86 when we come over to Russia, even if it has a bad ejection seat."

Orlov: "I will answer in order. You stated that we started with 8200 names two years ago. Since then the list increased and decreased. In a 9 August 1993 excerpt in U.S. *News and World Report*, it was stated that there were 10,218 POWs. Then, with our efforts, that figure went down to 2220. As far as we are

concerned, by April 1993 we had data on 249 pilots who became POWs. We determined that only the fates of thirty-one pilots were not known. Then the American side reduced this number to thirteen pilots. This was task one. Today and in December we gave information on many names. Maybe there will be the names of those missing pilots. We have started searches not only for these documents but for others, everywhere. There are reports from China. Marshall Krosovskii was there. He did report to Moscow. In his report he named many pilots. I have two documents here I will give; they will help clarify things for us. Maybe names will be found in other documents as well. As an example, on 4 December 50 a B-45 was shot down in East Andung. It had a crew of three. The pilot, Charles McDonough, is mentioned. When interrogated, he said that when they landed the navigator escaped; the radio operator disappeared somewhere. The prisoner himself suffered many burns and was in serious condition. This report was from Krosovskii, an Air Force commander. Then several days later they reported that the B-45 pilot died during transportation.

"We have another document dated 4 December 1950: the type plane, crash site, name of aircraft commander, but his name distortion shows that the Chinese did the interrogation. Typical Chinese distortion."

Johnson: "I understand. Did the Chinese capture them or was it the Russians?"

Orlov: "It's not clear from the documents."

Johnson: "This was early in the war. Did you have units there then?"

Orlov: "It crashed in Andung. The second document concerns a 30 October 1952 report regarding an RB-50 that was shot down near Can Chun. There were thirteen people on board. Eleven survived; their names and ranks are listed. Two died and their names and ranks are also listed. The same date, type, location, people. The last document also went to Moscow. Here is listed the names Smith and Harvey, mentioned 5 February 1951, which is an approximate date, the date of resolution. There is no more information here. There are some facts but not related to our work. [Two pages of documents passed] Also if Viktor Vasil'evich [Mukhin] agrees, we must look in a new strata of documents -- as long as names are in them. Maybe not only pilots but also other servicemen. This is our first new direction."

Johnson: "This is a note sent to Col. Parr about those documents. Two of them -- Geller, which is Heller, and Fisher -- were in my unit. Fisher gave me two names of people who were held with him. One was Lyle Kamer who flew an F-84 and Andy McKenzie who flew F-86s, was a Canadian exchange pilot and flew with us. He claims that he was shot down by an F-86. This may be where the stories about the rogue F-86 came from. MiGs sometimes looked like F-86s."

Volkogonov: "Maybe it was an American mistake. There were cases where our own planes were shot down by our own bombers."

Johnson: "The references which you listed for these documents, do you have them with you?"

Orlov: "No, I don't understand."

Johnson: "There are four references you listed for those documents; do you have them with you?"

Orlov: "The documents are lengthy; what was taken out was the related text. Those were reports for long periods of time."

Johnson: "Where do you think we should go to look for citation references?"

Orlov: "What we gave you. Look at the names and try to match them [with losses]. We'll continue our search."

Volkogonov: "We're asking you to determine the names of these eleven people." [NB: correct figure:

thirteen] "They may be living in the U.S. and we would be wasting our time."

Johnson: "I understand. Earlier you said we should look in other places where we have not looked before."

Orlov: "Viktor Vasil'evich [Mukhin] will tell you."

Mukhin: "Today General Volkogonov gave Mr. Toon a number of documents and nomenclature plates. I'd like to personally hand Congressman Johnson some documents, namely a photo showing parts of American planes held by archivists. I'd like to hand you this black and white photo."

Johnson: "Thank you. We'll look at the documents and try to determine whether they are from our planes or not. The parts you brought from Moscow are from China."

Mukhin: "I'll start chronologically to describe what has been turned over. Then it will be clear where the plates came from." [Handed over four sets of documents] "The first are documents on the interrogation of American POW's. Today, General Volkogonov handed over some documents with selected American names. The second represents reports regarding anti-aircraft artillery. When the artillery shot down a U.S. aircraft, a small file was started. It consisted of photos of the destroyed plane and a report of the shoot-down from the Division Commander on how the plane was shot down. Today Gen. Volkogonov handed over copies of the plates and the Division Commander reports."

Volkogonov: "Col. Mukhin will continue to work this because the volume of information is huge."

Mukhin: "And the last set of documents are from our pilots who were stationed in China on Laodung Peninsula. Last time we were in Podol'sk, Col. Parr looked at the after action reports from scientific conferences where pilots discussed their combat activities. We will pick out all last names and place them in a card file. Archivists are continuing to work through a lot of material. They will look deeper and, perhaps, find more names. Our work in this area is not stopping and as soon as we find something new we will pass the information on to Col. Parr. Before our departure, Col. Parr sent two documents to us in Podol'sk. We are already working on these."

Johnson: "Were the Chinese interrogations automatically passed to the Russians or did you have to ask for them?"

Orlov: "From those that we have received you see that they are translations by the Chinese, from Chinese interrogations. I can't say there was a definite procedure. If the American pilots ended up at Soviet anti-aircraft artillery airfields they were questioned by the Soviets then passed to the Chinese or Koreans."

Johnson: "And not the reverse?"

Orlov: "No, we didn't have camps. Let's clarify the interaction between us and China. If we had to know some information we asked the Chinese or the Koreans and they would bring a person to question, or they would just pass the interrogation protocols that documented the exchange."

Johnson: "When prisoners were brought to you, did you keep them or return them to the Chinese?"

Orlov: "We immediately returned them. With the Chinese I am not sure, but the Koreans were always present."

Johnson: "We [Johnson and Fisher] talked about Mukhdin. Fisher said it was a transient site, and that people kept moving in and out. Can you confirm this?"

Orlov: "As for China, 64FAC protected Chinese air space. There were other regiments in Harbin and Port Arthur. In Mukdin there was a huge airstrip, wide."

Johnson: "I've flown over it."

Orlov: "There were divisions in China and Korea, and furthermore the two divisions alternated. There were three divisions total, with two of them in Andung. Fisher holds this opinion also."

Johnson: "Were there any periodic reports of 64FAC or final reports which were sent to some other area other than Podol'sk?"

Orlov: "Interrogations were dispatched to Moscow. Krosovskii sent them directly to Moscow. Each chief commander would report to Moscow. There was no common collection point [other than Moscow]. After that everything went to Mukhin [for archiving]."

Mukhin: They were sent to the Air Force General Staff unchanged. Everything was recorded, translated, and then sent on. It was all sent from Krosovskii's group and 64FAC."

Johnson: "You're checking them all?"

Mukhin: "The analysis of documents took place in the General Staff of the Air Force."

Orlov: "When they were sorted the VVS was not really interested in the names, only in the data. As far as the pilots' names are concerned, they would be in the original documents, not in the General Staff reports."

Mukhin: "For example, the Staff might produce a report like "How to teach Soviet pilots on the basis of military experience." This report would not contain U.S. names.

Johnson: "I see. We did the same thing."

Orlov: "Can we say that this issue is settled for today."

Johnson: "Yes, I know that there are many interrogations, we are talking about a few. I know that you will continue to look for more."

Orlov: "Yes, we will."

[break]

Orlov: "When we talked yesterday we said some of the pilots were sent to the USSR. I said I did not exclude that possibility, but that there is, to date, no concrete data."

Johnson: "I understand. That is what you said. I know Gen. Volkogonov spoke and said there could have been. I agree."

Volkogonov: "This is the paradox of the problem. We can not confirm nor deny that this happened."

Johnson: "I agree. You did find an F-86 in a Design Bureau. Would it be possible to look at it in Moscow; maybe we could look at the record for this plane."

Orlov: "That is doubtful, but we can see. Because we called all the directors of museums and to all collectors. I cannot say one-hundred percent but I am almost certain that the plane is not intact.

Volkogonov: "I just spoke to the chief designer of Sukhoi. He said that he personally prepared stands for American aircraft; two or three were intact. After two or three years they learned everything they needed to know and destroyed the parts. This person is still alive and would be willing to talk to you."

Volkogonov: "I gave him a provocative question. 'Did not any Americans assist you?' He said, 'What

American pilots? No.' You can talk with him, but he does not know. He does know others [in the design bureau]."

Orlov: "We know that there were two or three aircraft. When you ask people whether they had seen an aircraft, no one claims to have seen any. We are looking but have not yet found anything."

Johnson: "How would materials have been transferred back to Moscow?"

Orlov: "We do not know how they were transported."

Johnson: "You did not have a transport command or send them by train?"

Orlov: "We don't know. We assume big parts by rail and smaller parts by air."

Volkogonov: "The order to move the aircraft could have come verbally by phone. Someone could have given orders by phone from Moscow to send such and such parts. The Commander of the 64th would, in turn, inform by phone what he was sending. For example, I estimate that Stalin met several times with Kim Il Sung. Yet we have only a detailed manuscript for a 5 March 45 and a 9 February 1950 telegram for Kim on unification of Korea. In beginning of April [1950?], Kim was sent to Moscow to meet with Stalin. The secret visit was arranged orally. There was a document of thanks but no documents on the meeting. So I suspect that these two leaders arranged for the meeting verbally. Kissinger also came to Moscow without the knowledge of the American Embassy. Only the American President and Brezhnev knew about

Orlov: "On the F-86 issue, we estimate that one or two aircraft were brought to Moscow or its suburbs. There are several witnesses to this. Now we are looking for documents. We hope to have some ready by the next meeting. We have not established how the F-86s were sent to Moscow, we will continue to search. We have not establish that there was a transfer of American pilots to Moscow. There is great doubt that we ever will."

Johnson: "I am sure there are photos you haven't found yet, I hope you will continue to look. Can we speak with Blagoveshchenskii? Is he willing to talk to us?"

Orlov: "As far as I know this may already have taken place. He is alive."

Volkogonov: "If you would like, I can help."

Orlov: "Let's stop working with the F-86."

Johnson: "Yes."

Orlov: "Third Issue. General Volkogonov spoke about it today. We should turn to the Chinese side."

Johnson: "I agree."

Volkogonov: "I feel such informal conversation helps us in our work."

Pifer: "I understand all documents from the 64th FAC were sent directly to Moscow, and all other documents went to Moscow. For example, the documents we are looking at now?"

Orlov: "All went to Moscow to the VVS Staff."

Volkogonov: "Technologically advanced countries can not permit other countries to gain technological superiority. Therefore all high tech items went to Moscow for technological exploitation. When Israel beat the Arabs in the Six Day War, they captured tanks, some of which I am sure ended up in the U.S."

Mukhin: "I am sure you will show us some day."

[Korean War Working group adjourned]

The Korean War Working Group reconvened at 0830, 1 March 1994.

Johnson: "If you want, you can open the session."

Orlov: "Yes, thank you. We suggest opening our session by beginning work on a joint report for the overall record."

Johnson: "First we have reviewed your documents. We have several requests before winding down."

Orlov: "OK."

Johnson: "Good. Yesterday you gave us a piece of paper that referenced two documents. We asked about seeing the entire document referenced by you. We would like a full copy of the document to investigate for ourselves."

Orlov: "I am not sure. It is a report that contains other things. We gave all that pertains to POWs."

Johnson: "I understand. The list of pilots' names leads us to think that we can determine where other names might be located. Due to discrepancies, we would like to see the entire document."

Orlov: "The report on McDonough is short. It is almost fully presented in the text. Where he died on the way -- that is the full text. As far a POWs we have given all."

Johnson: "If that's the case, we should be able to see the entire document.

Orlov: "That is all."

Mukhin: "I don't think it will be a problem; I will show Parr in Podol'sk."

Orlov: "Harvey and Smith we can give in full, but what follows is what they talked about."

Johnson: "They talk about the number of interviews."

Orlov: "No, during interrogation of Harvey and Smith they said...."

Johnson: "If you let Col. Parr see it, O.K."

Orlov: "O.K."

Johnson: "I have a question in two parts: one, can we see the periodic reports of the 64FAC?"

Mukhin: "Yes, no problem."

Johnson: "As we say in the New Russia, God bless you."

Mukhin: "The last time Parr was in Podol'sk he read those reports for the whole time he was there. Read four or five reports, routine stuff, interesting from a historical viewpoint, interesting."

Orlov: "But not for getting names."

Mukhin: "Anti-air Defense gives more names. They played a direct role."

Johnson: "Did Parr look at these?"

Mukhin: "Yes, I can show you some documents. The second copy we passed you. On the back of each photo, there is written data on the shoot down. I emphasize AAA Defense has this information. By the way I can show you a dog tag."

Pifer: "I want to say what we're looking for in those reports. How many interrogations were there during the time frame? We ask this because we have received fifty or so interrogation files, yet COL Korotkov spoke of hundreds of files that crossed his desk. And we know of two instances where Russians interrogators..."

Orlov: "I thought we talked about this. We pointed out that there was an order forbidding contact. Also we noted that some people did not obey. I was one of those people."

Johnson: "Therefore their interrogations are not on the record."

Orlov: "I have said many times we have not found them."

Pifer: "If we could get information on how many interrogations were conducted and reported to Moscow, we could then look for them not only in Soviet archives but in others."

Mukhin: "I understand the interest in numbers. I understand that the historians Bushnaev, Korotkovy did not have access to archives that I do. They sometimes exaggerated. Interrogations! The 64th FAC acted -- they didn't write reports. Rather, they gathered material from the Chinese and Koreans and wrote reports to the Chief of Staff. They did not do any analysis, as this was done in Moscow. In intelligence materials there are just numbers of total interrogations. And in one document we looked in different fonds, and many archives in my opinion."

Orlov: "When we interviewed POW's for the 64th FAC, we looked for navigational and targeting devices. That was of immediate tactical use to the Commander of the 64th, not whether it went to Moscow or not."

Mukhin: "In the Main Staff they analyzed the data and drew conclusions. There were no pilots names in the data. They didn't need them. The intelligence department needed names only to show that they got the facts from specific sources.

Johnson: "We understand."

Orlov: "We were more interested in an individual's duty position than in his last name. A squadron commander knew more than did a radio operator. When in a hurry, we sometimes messed up names."

Johnson: "One more question about the 64th. You said the 64th was disbanded and closed. Can we have access to the final report? Did they make any report when they closed the unit down?"

Mukhin: "In the military archives, each unit has its own fond. When a unit is demobilized, all records go to that fond, and we get a report in the form of an historical memo. The military doesn't like to write. We have said we won't close a unit until we get the memo. I'll see COL Parr and show him."

Orlov: "The 64th [FAC] existed until 1954."

Johnson: "Would the Main Staff have different records of the shoot downs and the interrogations?"

Mukhin: "The first copy went to the Main Headquarters and a copy stayed with the Corps. During our search, we looked in both fonds -- the fond for the Main Staff and the 64th FAC. If you are interested in analyzing documents of the Main Headquarters, COL Parr can look at it and compare."

Pifer: "It makes sense that the analysis conducted by the Main Staff wouldn't have names, but there may

well be some indication of the number of interrogations."

Mukhin: "They weren't interested. I can say that they weren't so interested in how many as in tactical and technical information."

Johnson: "Who was Razuvayev?"

Orlov: "I personally knew him. He was a lieutenant general and senior advisor in Korea -- the Ambassador who replaced Shtykov in 1951. I don't know if that was his rank but he was the boss. In 1953 he was recalled and in 54-55 he was made Chief of Staff of the PVO [Air Defense Forces] of the country. I also served under him. In 1957 he joined the PVO faculty of the Military Academy of the General Staff. He was there until 1968. He retired in 1968 didn't work again and died in Moscow."

Johnson: "Was he involved with POWs?"

Orlov: "To an extent. I can't say what his role might have been. He was the chief advisor to the Koreans. He received data from the Koreans and the 64th was subordinate to him as well as to other chains of command."

Mukhin: "He was not only a military advisor, but also the political ambassador. Everyone reported to him. His reports did not go to the MOD. He reported to the Politburo and to Stalin. I looked in our archives and didn't find anything. Just his personnel file."

Johnson: "Did he write any memoirs?"

Orlov: "In the last few years there were rumors of letters of Razuvayev. Their existence has not been confirmed. I knew him: he was not the [literary] type. He was a soldier who swore he was not a writer."

Mukhin: "Many Generals before dying give their letters and memoirs to us. We got nothing from Razuvayev."

Johnson: "It would have been interesting to talk to him. I could swear right back."

Johnson: "Mr. Pifer wants to know if it was a whole aircraft or if only parts? I believe you said it was an entire aircraft."

Orlov: "Pilots said it was an entire aircraft captured in Korea. But how it was delivered we do not know."

Johnson: "Next question. Shtykov -- where would we find his papers?"

Orlov: "I can't say -- as with Razuvayev, probably in the Politburo or the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]."

Johnson: "You found them?"

Mukhin: "No, we looked."

Johnson: "Have you exhausted all resources in the Politburo looking for material?"

Mukhin: "I was in the Presidential Archives. Our specialists there are Volkogonov, Kozlov and Osipov."

Johnson: "Are they looking?"

Mukhin: "Yes, but ask them."

Johnson: "Have we looked at all security service archives?"

Mukhin: "General Krayushkin said at the last meeting that they have given all that they have."

Johnson: "MPA [Main Political Administration]?"

Mukhin: "Documents we gave you yesterday are from there. The MPA documents are primarily concerned with ideology, morale, and political considerations of the American forces and in uncovering American imperialism."

Johnson: "Files of the Border Guards?"

Mukhin: "Other."

Orlov: "General Zaporshchenko said he would search the archives. He looked with COL Parr for documents on the 82nd Battalion. But nothing has been found to date. As Zaporshchenko said, it is also a confused system. Journals were not kept long."

Johnson: "He told us that they did not destroy these materials."

Orlov: "He said compiled data from journals was sent to HQ. As Volkogonov said when the breakup of the MVD-KGB-MGB, many documents were lost or destroyed."

Johnson: "You said you would give us documents with the names Button and DeMoyne. You have given us Smith and Harvey."

Orlov: "Those names came up in April of last year. DeMoyne was in a list that was passed as was Smith and Harvey. When I find additional data on Smith and Harvey, I will pass it. Please review the list we presented."

Johnson: "O.K. We will look, and pass that through Col. Parr. If not, maybe you could pass us the list again. We asked about Korotkov; do you know him?"

Orlov: "I work next to him."

Johnson: "He had a report on POW cooperation. At the last meeting you said we could have it.

Orlov: "You have it now. I gave it to you yesterday in the opening session. We looked at the text of Korotkov. As you correctly noted, he has many inconsistencies. He said he served in Khabarovsk. He said he was a colonel in the GRU, but actually he worked in the Main Political Administration. He, therefore, reported on morale, and also reported on the monitoring of radio and the press. He utilized interrogation reports for propaganda purposes. I think a report from him we gave you yesterday."

Mukhin: "Korotkov's name isn't there. He was a small fry."

Johnson: "You gave us a report on the morale of our servicemen yesterday?"

Orlov: "No, can't say. They were supposed to have given it to you."

Johnson: "We have it. Sorry. The article in *Ivestia* talking about three servicemen listed as MIA's?"

Mukhin: "There was also an article on ramming."

Orlov: "I talked with Burbyga about the articles. He is not right. He said we lost so many. How many Americans were lost is not known. I told him to check with more knowledgeable people before writing such articles."

Mukhin: "I also talked to him. He takes the good stuff, he doesn't dig. For example, the dog tag is only a

copy. But they made it look as if it were the real thing, but this is not so.

Johnson: "He does say that Wells, Ramsey and Wheelwright were killed in that crash."

Mukhin: "We'll have to look. Since we have a drawing of the dog tag, there should be a report. We can look for this particular person "Wells" based upon this dog tag."

Johnson: "Yes, because in our files they are missing."

Mukhin: "I'll give it to you at the next meeting in New York or Moscow." [laughter]

Pifer: "Please also look for Ramsey and Wheelwright. When we know that they are dead, we will be able to change our records to reflect their fate."

Mukhin: "Where did the names come from?"

Johnson: "Does it mention the names in the article?"

Orlov: "Yes, crew of three died."

Johnson: "From our records we got the other two names. Can we speak with the journalist?"

Mukhin: "He read the reports of the anti-aircraft defense. He got it from them. As promised, Mr. Johnson, I will get all that I can for next time."

Pifer: "The Soviet pilot Subboyin, who rammed an F-86. He mentions finding a pistol, an ID card, and a parachute. Can we get some info on that?"

Mukhin: "I personally provided this information. The only thing that we have is that Subboyin rammed him."

Johnson: "Did the Chinese show you the parachute?"

Mukhin: "No, the pilot said that."

Johnson: "Can we meet with the pilot?"

Mukhin: "Yes. Question: do you know the name of the pilot? 21 June 1951?"

Johnson: "Tail number -- there, is that real?" [pointing to photo]

Mukhin: "No, he did it as an example."

Johnson: "We'll try to find the name."

Mukhin: "I think this is good information. People are interested. Subboyin wrote to this correspondent himself."

Orlov: "All of this information was known before. Lobov wrote an article in 1991 in "AV and KOC" and he mentioned Subboyin and described it all. Memoirs of Avakurm. He is alive and living in Moscow. I have the telephone number of many pilots."

Mukhin: "Do U.S. papers publish such articles?"

Johnson: "Not often."

Orlov: "When they do an article they do a good job. As an example, a U.S. *News and World Report* article and BBC film on 9 February in London. Both showed an expedition in Armenia about a C-130. It was a long article with many details. I think besides family members, there are other people mentioned in the article."

Johnson: "Let's take a break."

[Break]

Johnson: "Let's continue and try and finish before lunch, and then we can summarize.

-- Derskiy, I know that you don't like him or, I should say, are troubled by his credibility. He apparently kept a notebook and in it there were four names mentioned: Sirman, Reeves, Morris, Wood. These men are missing."

Orlov: "We will look, but I doubt the accuracy. We'll check."

Johnson: "It's important for us to consider that while we speak mostly of pilots that we can not overlook the many ground troops that were lost and may have been taken prisoner somewhere. From my view point and from the viewpoint of the family, a soldier is just as important as a pilot."

Orlov: "Right, but we concentrate on pilots because they would be the most likely to be specialists and end up in the Soviet Union."

Johnson: "I understand."

Orlov: "Therefore of those 8000 POWS, 249 pilots....."

Johnson: "But you will agree that the conditions that the Koreans maintained would allow them to have been moved in work groups to China and the USSR."

Orlov: "Yes, but in the course of two years we have yet to find anyone."

Johnson: "Cecil Stoner. The Russian side of the Commission turned over a telegram dated 3 September 1953 which talked of the transfer of Stoner; he was a defector. The documents give the order number of the transfer. We are not interested in Stoner but rather in how the transfer was made. The NKVD, MVD, and Convoy Troops were involved. This focuses our attention on these archives. We would like to review a copy of the NKVD 1952 directive to see if there was any information on the transfer of POWs."

Mukhin: "General Kallinin can, perhaps, answer this after dinner. Do you have in mind Directive 1952 or the collective works of 1950?"

Johnson: "1952."

Orlov: "I don't know about it. I know that in the 1950's we published regulations on how to incarcerate prisoners..."

Johnson: "Directive 27/00500-52. I will give you a copy of the translated text. I'll ask you to do that. Now, let's talk summary. Thank you for your attention."

Orlov: "That's why we met here."

Johnson: "What are your ideas for the summary statement?"

Orlov: "I think, at the suggestion of the co-chairmen, we should highlight. In the last two days we concentrated on the following:

1. The study of new documents regarding information related to American POW's;

2. Specific discussion regarding the transport of F-86's to the USSR; and

3. Clarification today of questions lingering from past sessions."

Johnson: "You mean that we attempted to find specific names which we discussed along with the documents."

Orlov: "Yes, that, but I am talking about which problems we touched on and what conclusions we reached."

Johnson: First, give Col. Parr access to Podol'sk archives to look at the references we talked about; second, look at the periodic and final reports of the 64th FAC; and third, allow Col. Parr to compare the documents of the 64th FAC and the reports compiled by the Headquarters Staff."

Mukhin: "I see our current mission to be to:

1. We will work with Parr: I will be there with materials from the 64th and the Main HQ of the VVS;

2. We will look for all anti-aircraft defense files not turned over to date, reports that list dog tags, etc.;

3. We will find confirmation on how planes that were sent from Korea arrived in Moscow.

4. Finally, we will look deeper for Shtykov and Razuvayev materials. Maybe we have some remnants."

Orlov: "I think Mukhin stated [our goals] correctly."

Johnson: "That's fine; my colleagues and I agree."

Mukhin: "Archival information from the MOD is adequate. Border Guard, KGB, MVD perhaps not so."

Orlov: "Recently there has been much better cooperation between us."

Mukhin: "About our work in general, not only our work in Korea. When we meet at plenary sessions, we would like to get a copy of all the material that goes to Toon. Both from the American side and our own. This will make our work more effective and less bureaucratic."

Ross: "We don't give Toon a written report. We only brief him orally."

Orlov: "We just want to know in general."

Ross: "We can do that."

Mukhin: "Add the point that the MOD gave more than anything, so I would like the first copy." [laughter]

Johnson: "Since we have the time, I would like to take you to the Capital and give you a tour."

Orlov: "Thank you.

Johnson: "You can compare it with the Duma."

Mukhin: "I saw the Pentagon. In some ways, it's the same with us: wires hanging down."

Johnson: "The same everywhere. Lets take a break and have some coffee, say 45 minutes.

Orlov: "We thank our colleagues for these two days. With every session we better understand each other."

Johnson: "Thank you.

Ross: "I look forward to tomorrow and meeting you in the DPMO offices."

Mukhin: "Thank you.

**MINUTES OF THE VIETNAM WORKING GROUP Eighth Plenum of the USRJC for POW/MIA Affairs**

The Vietnam War Working Group convened 28 March 1994 under the leadership of Congressman Peterson and Professor Kozlov, and their respective staffs.

*Peterson:* "We know you're all tired with jet lag, and we're not, but we'll try to share this discomfort as we do the work. I want to welcome my Russian colleagues to the first working group session held in the United States. The other commission members and I hope you are enjoying your visit. In addition to the serious work of the plenary and working groups, we have tried to include some interesting activities in your schedule. I hope that your visit will be both stimulating and enjoyable. If there is anything I can do to improve your stay, please feel free to contact me or anyone on my staff. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to a most productive working group session and another excellent round of discussions over the next three days.

"As the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Vietnam Working Group, I believe your visit provides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the importance of the POW/MIA issue from our perspective. I should start by bringing you up to date on recent developments in our bilateral relationship with Vietnam. On February 3, President Clinton decided to lift the trade embargo against Vietnam and to open a liaison office in Hanoi. He said he was taking this action because he was convinced that it offered the best way to resolve the fate of those Americans who are missing. At the same time he stressed that "any decision about our relationship with Vietnam should be guided by one factor -- gaining the fullest possible accounting for prisoners of war and our missing in action." I want to underscore this point: the POW/MIA issue is the central focus of our relationship with Vietnam and achieving the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIAs continues to be our primary objective with the Vietnamese and among the highest of national priorities. I want to make it clear that President Clinton's action on 3 February does not mean any lessening of our determination to learn the fate of our missing Americans.

"This major event is a milestone on the path of resolving the POW issue to the satisfaction of the constituencies we serve. As I said last December, we must continue our search: we must exhaust all possible sources of information to their maximum potential. In fact, I should add that President Clinton said we would reimpose sanctions if progress on these matters did not continue. But we are concerned with humanitarian questions here. We must continue and exhaust every source to the fullest extent possible.

"The events of the coming week should allow you to experience the many facets of American public involvement with the POW/MIA issue. This week you will have an opportunity to hear from family members of missing Americans; they are the people whom we serve in the most direct way. It is my hope that when you meet them, you will begin to understand what we are trying to achieve with the questions we ask and the requests we make. We will also meet the press this week, and I anticipate that you will experience the high interest that this issue holds in the public forum. At each of these events I am confident that you will gain an appreciation for the strong sense of commitment held by the American public for achieving the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs.

"Finally, you will have an opportunity to visit the Defense POW/MIA Office, the National Archives, and other U.S. Government facilities that support the gathering and processing of information relating to POW/MIAs. I want you to see the tremendous commitment of manpower and resources we have dedicated to this endeavor, and the hard work expended to investigate each and every case of a missing

American from Vietnam. We have spoken of this before, but now you will see it for yourselves.

"Before I begin with the substance of my remarks, I would like to address our accomplishments at the September and December [1993] working group sessions. Frankly, the U.S. side is highly impressed with the documents provided at the September and December sessions [TFR 179-1 and GRU Study, respectively]. For reasons that I will explain in detail, we believe these documents to be key in defining what we hope to achieve in the work of the Vietnam Working Group.

"I want to thank our colleagues from the Ministry of Defense and the security services for the unprecedented access to this type of information. Here we are trying to give the Ministry of Defense and security services explicit recognition. It is specifically the type of information we have sought all along and represents a new level in our mutual cooperation. Before the close of my remarks today, I will explain why these documents are important to our effort, and I will present some new initiatives on how to proceed with our work in the future. Before I continue I would like to allow Mr. Kozlov to speak."

*Kozlov:* "I wish to express our thanks to Senator Smith and Congressman Peterson for this opportunity to meet here in Washington. This shows the high degree of U.S. attention to their lost men in Vietnam. Again, we see how truly interested the U.S. is, and we are eager to close this chapter of history. We would not wish to see our work acquire any political overtones; as Congressman Peterson said earlier [in the opening Plenum], this is a problem of history and humanitarian concerns. It is these two circumstances that determine Russia's work on solving the question of missing U.S. servicemen, and the method is total impartiality in our work.

"I would like to reiterate something I have said before. Among all my Russian colleagues we have good will in our attitude toward the truth; the problem is the massive scale of the work. The results attest to this; General Volkogonov already mentioned it in passing this morning.

*Peterson:* "Yes, it is a massive humanitarian and historical problem. I could not help but notice that the U.S. has a larger political representation than does the Russian side. But you should realize we are truly representatives of our constituencies. So the questions come from the American people, in our pursuit of closure on the POW/MIA issue.

"At the outset I first want to restate that our mission is a humanitarian one: that we seek only to determine the fate of Americans missing in Southeast Asia. I propose the following structure for my remarks today: first, I want to discuss the goals of the Vietnam working group. Two sets of circumstances dictate why this is important. You have asked the question about closure on the Vietnam issue during our last meeting. Further, documents provided in the September and December 1993 sessions are recent acquisitions, and they suggest that we have only recently approached the full potential of what the working group might accomplish. Therefore, I propose that we define the objectives of the Vietnam working group in specific terms. I have an outline of four substantive questions to guide our efforts, and they will provide the basis to focus our work, and to later determine the timing of adjournment and closure. This is not a short-term goal; rather, we're setting accomplishments as our goal. I will then discuss each of these questions in detail, with a look at our present analysis of the issue and perspectives on how to proceed in our work.

"By the time this week is over I hope you will have a clear understanding of, first, what the U.S. side hopes to achieve; second, how we propose to accomplish this, given what we have learned to date; and third, why we pursue the issue with such fervor. I propose that the Vietnam working group should focus on exhausting all potential sources of information on four topical questions. Significant work has already been done on each of these; we'll later discuss each in greater clarity. These are all tough questions.

"Question 1: Did Soviet forces or security services acquire and transport U.S. prisoners of war from Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union?

"Question 2: To what degree did Soviet forces access U.S. prisoners of war or information about them?

"Question 3: What information is available from either Soviet documents or witnesses on the strategic level of understanding by the Soviets of the fate of U.S. prisoners of war in Vietnam, that is, the total numbers, Vietnamese and Soviet policies regarding them, propaganda issues, negotiating positions, and policies on remains?

"Question 4: What information is available from either Soviet documents or witnesses on a level which can address specific cases of loss of Americans in Southeast Asia?

"I believe that our work on Vietnam will be completed when we have agreed on the best possible answers to these questions based on an exhaustive review, within reasonable limits, of evidence, documents, and testimonials from witnesses. On some questions we appear to be close to this end; on others we possibly have only begun. Let us take these questions one at a time; we are essentially now detectives."

*Mazurov:* "May we interrupt the statement as we proceed?"

*Peterson:* "Of course. On the question of taking and transporting prisoners, for many, this is a burning issue. It represents the deep suspicions about adversarial relations between the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Our current analytical perspective on this question is that there is no credible evidence at this time that this occurred, as we view it from our side. There has been a great deal of rumor, gossip, and conjecture on this theory; most has not withstood even basic analytical or evidentiary scrutiny. However, rumors continue to persist, and we continue to pursue every lead. A case in point: the leads pursued by Colonel Parr (TFR-M) to the Krasnodar graves of American prisoners. To reach final resolution of this question we continue to believe that information can best be obtained from records and witnesses to KGB activities in Vietnam; records and witnesses to GRU activities in Vietnam; and..."

*Mazurov:* "[Records] from which country?"

*Peterson:* "From your side. We are also pursuing this with the Vietnamese. And resolution can be obtained from the audit trail associated with equipment and parts gathered in Vietnam and taken to the Soviet Union. I would like to request the security services (former KGB, GRU) to conduct name traces in their automated holding for references to missing American servicemen from Vietnam, as reflected in our listing of "Personnel Missing in Southeast Asia" [PMSEA]."

*Mazurov:* "I should add that the Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR] already did that, manually, not by automated holdings, in 1992. [With general agreement of Russian side:] Yes, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] produced the 510 list; that was in February 1992. You see, there are three different groups in SRV, each independent of one another. The PMSEA list was run against the holdings and on 17 February 1992, and the results were given to Senators Smith and Kerry. We received the PMSEA list in 1992. Here I can speak on behalf of General Krayushkin. One copy of the PMSEA list went to MVD, one to the Security Services. Regarding information applicable to the interests of the Commission -- nothing was found. Not one name. Quite simply, a family name and a first name are not sufficient for such research; how many Smiths or Jones are there? Hundreds."

*Peterson:* "What more than full names, service numbers, dates and places of loss, do you need to do research? What if we gave you more explicit and detailed lists? What would be the prospects then for success?"

*Mazurov:* "Well, we know 25% of the names on the PMSEA already returned to the U.S. where they occupy positions of importance in the U.S. government. Then there are still the problems of duplicate names, which can come from any source. Diplomats, foreign travellers, common criminals and others might all come within the purview of security service files."

*Peterson:* "What information would make your search productive?"

*Mazurov:* "The sort of information I put on my *anketa* [questionnaire, presumably for a visa] to come to

the U.S.!"

*Kozlov:* "I would suggest at least the addition of the aircraft serial number, in the case of air losses."

*Peterson:* "I propose that Colonel Parr and Colonel Mazurov come up with an agreed upon list of the information necessary to conduct the SVR search. We will then provide the information to you.

*Smith:* "I am confused in the problem with the 3750 [PMSEA] list, and with lists in general. General Volkogonov referred [in the opening Plenary session] to the similarity between the list of 41 and the July 1992 list. There was not a direct match, but is there more information?"

*Mazurov:* "This list is from the MVD. The list of 41 is from before the Korean War period, of people imprisoned in the 1930s and 1940s and still in prison in 1968."

*Smith:* "But from which U.S. list did you work?"

*Mazurov:* "The 3750 list, which was compared to the card catalogue of the MVD."

*Smith:* "One concrete example of this problem is Mel Holland, who was lost in 1968. Can you show us who the Melvin Holland, on your list of 41 spurious names, that individual correlates to?"

*Kozlov:* "We looked at all this, every time.

*Peterson:* "Colonel Parr and TFR-M will consult with you to decide what additional information you need to conduct meaningful searches. Also, Colonel Parr, would you draft with Dr. Kozlov an agreement on which list is which -- who has what information and from where that information came, so we might all be working from the same agreed upon information. And we will give you the additional information you need to proceed."

*Mazurov:* "One question: can we close on the list of 41?"

*Peterson:* "No, we must clarify this entire matter. Let us move on to question 2. On the question of Soviet access to prisoners, it is just like the previous question, and is rife with suspicion, conjecture and assumptions."

*Mazurov:* "But why examine the question of transportation of U.S. POWs to the territory of the former USSR? These pilots knew nothing about scientific or technical matters, metallurgy, etc."

*Peterson:* "Technical information, rules of engagement, weapons systems and order of battle --it is the usual information either of us would have been interested in. This has been normal throughout the centuries. Now, we have a better understanding of your relationship with Vietnam in those years, and that your advisors and technicians would have reported directly to Moscow rather than through their North Vietnamese hosts. Therefore, the Soviet participants might have a fragment of information that would solve one question about one missing man or another. This is true also of any U.S. equipment that might have fallen into Russian hands."

*Smith:* "Regarding transportation of U.S. prisoners, the documents General Volkogonov provided us last April [1993] noted the great frustration the Soviet advisors were having getting information from Vietnam on an American aircraft shot down. The document said that many items of equipment were gotten only by going directly to the site of a crash, and not through the Vietnamese hosts." [TFR 136-11]

*Peterson:* "Our present analytical perspective on this issue is this. It is clear that the Soviets did not enjoy as broad a level of access to U.S. prisoners as once was assumed. However, there are still major gaps in our understanding of the depth of these relationships, and how they might have changed over time. Regarding the question of Soviets directly interrogating U.S. prisoners of war: the evidence to date suggests that this did not occur. One related case has been identified which involved contact between a

U.S. POW and a Soviet intelligence officer -- the Nechiporenko case.

"We are left with the expectation, however, that Soviet personnel performing various functions in, for, or with North Vietnam may have gathered data on U.S. prisoners, such as biographic and assessment information; political and propaganda information; technical intelligence information on specific tactical and operational matters.

*Smith:* "Take for instance information we received from a Vietnamese defector. He said that there was a phosphate plant in Bien Phu, where Soviet teams interrogated U.S. POWs, and that there was a Soviet "exploitation team" stationed in Haiphong which had difficulties getting Vietnamese cooperation to access U.S. equipment. Might that have also applied to U.S. pilots?"

*Mazurov:* "What was the source of this information?"

*Smith:* "A report of a Vietnamese defector."

*Peterson:* "Soviet personnel might have also collected information on North Vietnamese policies towards prisoners -- numbers, disclosure policy, perspectives on international law, international opinion, decisions about release, and so on. We therefore request that the Russian side search for the following possible holdings of documents, and redouble their efforts to locate and convince witnesses associated with these events to speak with the Joint Commission. In all our requests I want to highlight that we seek only the information that relates to U.S. prisoners of war and missing in action, and their identification and fates.

"For the former KGB and GRU, this would include possible records or general assessment documents, general collection requirements, questionnaires, or other documents used to identify and assess U.S. prisoners, remembering that we are interested in names and dates prepared, and not in the substance of such documents. Also, the KGB/GRU holdings for any specific messages or collection requirements focused on procuring specific information from a U.S. prisoner via liaison with North Vietnamese.

"For the Ministry of Defense, and here we're trying to be more specific as requested by your side: journals, logs, notes, messages, any communication from advisors, trainers, or field activities in Vietnam regarding U.S. prisoners of war or missing in action. Also, the daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports of PVO units stationed in Vietnam, as they reflect the POW/MIA question.

"For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: we request that organizations involved in international law search their records for documents and witnesses on the international law aspects of the U.S. POW issue in North Vietnam. Several international law issues existed in the 1960s and 1970s for which the North Vietnamese sought international support, and which must have drawn the attention of CPSU and MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] scholars, lawyers, propagandists, and statesmen. For instance, the issue of "war criminals" versus prisoners of war; the applicability of the Geneva Conventions toward POWs in Vietnam; policies toward international journalists, the Red Cross, and neutral intermediaries; and the policies toward the Hague International Law Court, and the United Nations. These are our specific focuses. And we'll provide detailed outline of all these points. These are the issues that define closure on the Vietnam question."

*Smith:* "I am puzzled by your response to Congressman Peterson's question of Soviet access to U.S. POWs, by asking "why would we be interested?" When I was in Communist North Korea they said that Soviet interrogators had interviewed U.S. POWs on Korean soil during the Korean War. Also, Primakov confirmed all this. So why would the Soviet Union not have been interested in the same thing during the Vietnam War?"

*Kozlov:* "We will reexamine our notes and respond tomorrow. But one thing inspires me: no mention has yet been made to U.S. POWs on Soviet soil during the Vietnam War. We all understand this, which is good, encouraging. We will examine all this further tomorrow."

*Mazurov:* "One clarification, please. Did Primakov say it was Soviet <u>intelligence</u> personnel, or just Soviet

individuals?"

*Smith:* "He was not explicit; Primakov offered a list but did not say whether they were intelligence personnel or not."

*Mazurov:* "Primakov did not say that."

*Smith:* "Yes he did -- we have the questionnaire that the Russians provided to the Koreans as well."

*Peterson:* "As an ex-POW I can say we gave great credit to the Soviet intelligence services for what they knew. Were we incorrect to give the GRU such great credit?"

*Mazurov:* "I have no information on this."

*Kozlov:* "It can be assumed that, given the relationship between Vietnam and the USSR at that time, the Chinese would also have had an interest."

*Peterson:* "Of course: there were files on all of us."

[Russian side, in unison: "Of course."]

*Peterson:* "Therefore, if we know who held these, we might know what else to look for."

*Kozlov:* "The questions you have asked have produced debate and pondering."

*Peterson:* "Argument can lead to understanding. I propose we adjourn our meeting at this point and reconvene tomorrow morning.

*Kozlov:* "Agreed."

[Adjournment]

The Vietnam War Working Group reconvened Tuesday morning, 1 March 1994, headed by Congressman Peterson and Professor Kozlov and their respective staffs.

*Peterson:* "Welcome back to our working group, and I hope you had a restful evening. We'll take breaks as necessary, but I hope we can finish our work this morning, so let's start. This document [136-11] shows that Shcherbakov had dealings with POWs. Thus, it is an important document that can lead to other things. We must observe that in 1969/1970 there was a low level of activity in Vietnam, and at that time there was also low level of political activity between Vietnam and the USSR regarding POWs.

"Therefore, given this void of activity, if there is opportunity to discuss archival evidence related to all this, for example, of the Soviet Red Cross in Vietnam, and assuming that North Vietnam was gradually renewing its relationship with the Soviet Union at the time, then where do you suggest we go from here with this?"

*Kozlov:* "Of course. Documents like the these -- regarding political strategy on U.S. POWs --there are many. We can present numerous documents. But we found nothing that helps us approach the specific issue of American POWs. Regarding the Soviet Red Cross and the Association of Fraternal Socialist Nations [Druzhba], these materials are in the State Archives of the Russian Federation [GARF]. Someone is examining the holdings now, but nothing is yet ready."

*Peterson:* "Good. I understand that there is nothing on specific cases, just about the political aspects, etc. But the Red Cross might have more specific information, such as locations, numbers of prisoners, their status, perhaps even regarding notification [of dependents]."

*Kozlov:* "I would like to return to some thoughts from the September 1993 Plenum. It seems to me that the following reflected the general position of the former Soviet government on U.S. POWs. The Soviet Red Cross had close connections with international organizations, and thus probably could not have been a tool of the Soviet political apparatus which would have avoided connections with such organizations. We will look, however."

*Peterson:* "Would the head of the Soviet Red Cross have had any special relationship with the Vietnam Red Cross?"

*Kozlov:* "Perhaps. We'll look for individuals involved for interviews. We have a large Red Cross card file we can use.

*Peterson:* "Good possibilities exist here. Perhaps a Red Cross worker visiting North Vietnam...

*Kozlov:* "Yes, good. We'll do that. Good."

*Peterson:* "The Shcherbakov document is very interesting. If we could find the rest of the diary..."

*Kozlov:* "It is not from a diary, but was just memorandum for the record, and the papers are made up of memoranda, letters, etc. The materials were apparently kept aperiodically."

*Peterson:* "And the other materials have already been screened for material?"

*Kozlov:* "I have personally examined much material in the Politburo archive, starting from 1959. My opinion on these materials is this: around 1966 or 1967, as I see it, the level of interest of the Soviet leadership in the POW question was not high, and it remained so until about 1967. So then I jumped forward to 1972-1973 and worked backwards carefully. At that later date the leadership was very interested. Why? Because by then the question was important for relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union intended to remain informed on this issue for its own interests. Earlier, they were only interested in crafting a strategy so as not to find themselves placed between the Vietnamese and the Americans on the issue. This is my subjective opinion, but it seems to me so far to be accurate."

*Peterson:* "It must have been an interesting trip through those historical materials. Would the change in focus that you observed have been reflected in other holdings and archives -- the security services, etc.?"

*Kozlov:* "That is very difficult to answer. I haven't personally worked in those materials. But there are three possible aspects of the U.S. POW issue that might have involved policy. First, the political aspect: the issue would be useful for pressure at the Paris discussions. Second, ideological: on the one hand it would provide materials for exposing aggressive American imperialism and also to influence public opinion and strengthen the international peace movement. Foremost, that would have involved American deserters. And third, the military- technical aspects.

"Among these, the first and second were undoubtedly priority for the political leadership. If we were to view it this way, any decision to bring U.S. POWs to the territory of the former Soviet Union would have been for reasons 1 and 2, not number 3. If prisoners were brought to the Soviet Union, then it would have been to extract advantage under aspects 1 and 2, not 3. And then, there would have been international legal implications, and very negative consequences for the Soviet Union. Yesterday's question regarding the interrogations in North Vietnam --that is legitimate; but we have no information on this yet."

*Peterson:* "Not even on a questionnaire format interrogation?"

*Kozlov:* "We'll keep looking. We'll verify this version of events and if it is correct, we will give you a list of individuals who were questioned. Captured weapons and equipment of course did come to the USSR; and not aircraft, but parts of them. We haven't any clues yet about where these went; but we have a promising source. There are also serious difficulties finding the sources of the equipment [from Vietnam]. I can tell you now, we don't know names or how the equipment came to the USSR."

*Peterson:* "I would like to make a couple more points here, but I truly applaud your efforts so far. We'll try to return to this, time permitting. We've completed the first two questions I had proposed yesterday, so far; now I would like to turn to question three. We are interested in the strategic level of understanding by the Soviets. The 1205 and 735 documents have been analyzed and the written assessment has been provided to the Russian side. The documents are interesting from the point of view of understanding some of the political aspects of the North Vietnamese decision making process on the question of U.S. POW/MIAs. The documents establish the amount and level of interest taken by the Soviet government in this issue. We have determined, however, that the information in the documents relating to the number of U.S. POWs held by the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, differs greatly from our understanding of the numbers that may have possibly existed at that time.

"We therefore restate our request that the search for documents and witnesses continue. *[Kozlov:* "Yes."] The interest in this issue by the former Central Committee, Politburo, and other senior leadership organs of the Soviet government has been established. This suggests documentary records and witnesses should be available through the Central Committee archives; the Presidential Archives; and the propaganda and informational services. We request an opportunity to view putevoditeli of the specific archives to identify possible fonds of documents.

"The interest of high level Soviet officials is what should have driven the effort by intelligence services to collect such information, either through the work of the International Department [Work with Friendly Socialist Nations], or via KGB and GRU clandestine collection means. We request that searches include the archives of the former First Chief Directorate, KGB; the archives of the American Department, GRU; and the archives of the MFA which documented official discourse between the governments of North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This is merely in recognition of the inaccuracy of the 1205 and 735 documents. Without other leads, however, they must remain in the public forum. You know what we think of them; is this a realistic approach to those archives?"

*Kozlov:* "Everything will be presented that we find. As for the security services, I met with the Chief of the GRU's successor and he assured me that all these documents would be presented before the next Commission plenum."

*Peterson:* "On information that may lead to future resolution of cases, we consider this the most interesting development in our work, and our analysis suggests that we may be on the verge of achieving some very significant and important new breakthroughs in this area. I want to spend some time on the detailed analysis of the two most recent Russian documents, the shootdown summary and the GRU document. They contain about 95 and 184 shootdown incidents, respectively. Because the information on each incident is too brief to make positive correlations, I remind you that some of the points I make below are preliminary findings. First, we examined the basic correlation of capture incidents listed in the two documents; of the 68 captures listed, 60 match possible cases from our PMSEA, and 14 of these matches are precise to dates, aircraft, number of personnel, or else were matched by unique features of the case." [graphic passed]

"Numerically, this is roughly a 90% basic agreement that the information listed in these two documents corresponds, at least basically, to actual loss events in Vietnam." [explanation of pie chart, time line chart]

"Again, remembering that the information is imprecise, we compiled the two documents, removed the apparent redundancies, and compared the numbers to statistics of actual U.S. losses in a narrow and defined category: surface-to-air missile and MiG air-to-air shootdowns [over North Vietnam] which comprised roughly 7% of U.S. air losses in Southeast Asia. Even more interesting to me is the accuracy of the GRU document in 1965 and 1966, and then its inaccuracy in 1967-1968, large differences."

*Kozlov:* "Why?"

*Peterson:* "Why?"

*Kozlov:* "Ask Vietnam!"

*Peterson:* "All these are air incidents -- MiG and missiles."

*[Mazurov:* quote from Soviet document on lack of Soviet advisors' access to equipment.]

*Peterson:* "Is there any evidence that Soviet advisors were restricted then [1967-1968] to Hanoi and Haiphong only?"

*Mazurov:* "Two diplomats who served in Vietnam spoke about this in the last Moscow Plenum, about the political relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and that we couldn't speak to Vietnamese citizens and such contacts were controlled by the Vietnamese."

*Peterson:* "We'll continue our analysis. What we've done leads us to believe that these two documents represent a pretty good picture of what the GRU knew and did not know about U.S. combat losses in Southeast Asia. All the incidents about which Soviet records have detailed information occurred over North Vietnam. None of the data refers to South Vietnamese or Cambodian incidents. Only minor references are made to Laos. All incidents are air incidents. All aircraft, where identified, are fixed-wing. This pattern in Soviet holdings resembles the pattern seen in North Vietnamese archives -- best, most complete records are on air incidents over North Vietnam.

"Most importantly, the 7-volume GRU study seems to provide an insight as to the sources of information used to compile the summaries of air incidents. Analysis suggests that Soviet analysts used information from the interrogation of U.S. POWs, information passed by the North Vietnamese on air incidents and captures, North Vietnamese and North Korean pilot debriefings, signals intelligence, and eye witnesses.

"In summary, these two documents represent exactly the type of information we have been seeking, and they hold great potential for the future work of our working group. Let me add that the source is <u>not</u> important to us. But obviously, use of all sources will yield the greatest information. Our analytical conclusion is that the detailed information on which these studies are based will hold information that may potentially lead to the resolution of open cases of missing American servicemen. Adding to our knowledge on specific loss incidents would be an extremely significant achievement for our working group.

"Allow me to illustrate an example. The 62nd, 63rd, and 79th incidents in the GRU study describe the shootdowns of three separate F-4 aircraft on 23 August 1967. American F-4 losses on that day included at least four F-4 aircraft. Of the nine aviators lost that day, four returned from imprisonment in 1973, three are presumed dead, one was killed and the body has not been recovered, and the remains of the last were returned by the North Vietnamese. Of the three presumed dead, one case remains on the list of cases which have the highest priority for investigation. In other words, unique circumstances about the case continue to warrant the search for documents, remains, witnesses, and any other available information. Of course, there is not enough information to correlate the data from the GRU study to specific loss incidents.

"However, we believe that the detailed reporting on which the GRU study is based may provide investigators and analysts additional information which may lead to resolving POW/MIA cases from Southeast Asia. So we have a plan. We wish to narrow the investigation. Therefore, my final request to my counterparts is that we undertake an effort to determine what information may be available in the raw data of Soviet intelligence and information gathering systems that may provide insight to specific cases of loss in Southeast Asia. We propose a careful look at the circumstances behind all incidents recorded on 23 August 1967. I ask that my Russian colleagues use this case as an example to determine the potential that this new research method has to offer. I hope that they will provide me a formal reply on what can and cannot be accomplished by following these leads. In the past we've asked questions that were too general, and by focusing on one day of the war, perhaps we'll find how much can be discovered about one action. What is your evaluation of this? We might add that we are not interested at this point in the list of 3750 [PMSEA] cases -- only in the discrete cases over North Vietnam that involve specific dates, the specific cases.

"This leads me to the final issue: the sensitivity of the information we are requesting. As we do our work in the Vietnam working group we are all faced with the problem of the classified nature of much of the material we work with. Vietnam is the most recent of the conflicts addressed but the Commission, and therefore should have the most information available on it. A great deal of information relating to Vietnam on both sides is still subject to classification restrictions for a myriad of reasons. We understand that a great deal of what we are asking for may fall in the realm of material that is very sensitive because of content, method of acquisition, or other national security concerns. I want you to know that I understand this, and that I find it important to be reasonable in stating requests from the U.S. side of the working group. I also want to stress that the purpose of the work is humanitarian, to find answers for the families of our missing Americans.

"I hope to have demonstrated the importance of searching for the "bits" of raw data that may be available on specific incidents of loss. We ask that data be provided in as much detail as possible, as soon as possible after it is found. Again, we are not asking for details about sources and methods of information acquisition. I continue to believe that accomplishments in this area may well be achievement in the highest tradition for which the Joint Commission was established.

"Having outlined the four major questions, I propose to close my remarks today with a review of our work. But first I propose we take a brief break."

[break]

*Peterson:* "From previous work we had some information you requested from us. I would like to pass that to you; it concerns Americans who transited the Soviet Union when seeking asylum from Vietnam." [list passed] "Four American prisoners of war from the Vietnam war were released by the North Vietnamese prior to Operation HOMECOMING in 1973 and transited the Soviet Union on their way home. The U.S. government was fully aware of these early releases and the intended itinerary. [Names of Cpl. Jon M. Sweeney, USMC; Maj. Edward K Elias, USAF; LTJG Norris A. Charles, USN; and LTJG Markham L. Gartley, USN, and itinerary information passed.]

*Peterson:* "I want to take this time to review our outstanding actions, with a request that we discuss their status point by point." [List passed] "We are waiting for a written report regarding the Russian investigation of the "footprints in the snow" in Kyakhta. When will we see the report?"

*Kozlov:* "We will remind the individual responsible for this report of the matter."

*Peterson:* "We continue to wait for access to the activities of the PVO units that served in Vietnam. This includes access to the PVO museum of the 9642nd PVO regiment in Bryansk..."

*Kozlov:* "We are ready for your visit whenever you wish."

*Peterson:* "How far is Bryansk from Moscow?"

*Kozlov:* "200-300 kilometers."

*Peterson:* "Also, records of other PVO regiments that served in North Vietnam; a copy of the PVO study, *Materials from the Testimony of American Aviators."*

*Kozlov:* "I don't know anything about this report."

*Peterson:* "Colonel Osipov knows about it; it was identified by a [Soviet] veteran.

*Koltovich:* "So far, no such document has been discovered."

*Kozlov:* "We'll clarify this with Colonel Mukhin."

*Peterson:* "It possibly might exist in aviation training organizations, schools, as a reference document."

*Kozlov:* "We will check on its existence and provide you a list of authors."

*Peterson:* "We expected the 13 name traces from the list of 41 to be discussed before the last Plenary meeting was completed. When will the U.S. side receive the reports of the review of these traces?"

[Russian side provides a letter]

*Kozlov:* "The individuals are all unrelated to the POW/MIA question, as you see. One name, for instance, was of a man born in Vienna in 1884, arrested as a spy in 1934, and repatriated to Austria in 1945. We have the files on these thirteen if you wish to come to see them. Another document contains accounting of Americans arrested in Germany as spies."

*Peterson:* "We continue to ask that the Russian side urge witnesses to appear for interview by the Joint Commission. Specifically, Amirov continues to be cited in the press. What is the status of efforts to convince Amirov to speak to the Joint Commission?"

*Kozlov:* "He and others refuse to meet or be interviewed by the Commission. Unfortunately they resist meeting, and we will work on other leads. Perhaps we will close out the question of the Red Cross. With witnesses, of course, time is important: one witness we identified recently died."

*Peterson:* "The difficulty here is that the war was 25 years ago. Senior commanders are elderly now. Therefore we need to accelerate our work before they die.

"As a result of our work together yesterday and today, we will provide better, more specific lists to guide your searches. We understand the difficulty in your records: Soviets had small detachments in Vietnam, not whole units. But we know that they submitted daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly reports directly to the General Staff, rather than through the Vietnamese. These are the sorts of reports which are especially important for their potential for identifying witnesses of the circumstances of loss incidents.

*Kozlov:* "We will look for such things."

*Koltovich:* "Bryansk may have this material. I recall documents with reminiscences among the training materials."

*Peterson:* "Yes -- insights on what happened at that time. We've moved quickly, and I don't want to overwhelm you. But we have a special frame of reference. As you can see, we have achieved a great deal, particularly in our last two sessions. Our achievements to date have allowed us to define and focus the working group's efforts. The GRU document is an example, and is inspiring to see what can be done. I look forward to our future working relationship. As we said in December and September [1993], our aim is to bring information to the families of missing Americans. Thus, the humanitarian basis of our work is clear. We must dig through every file, source, witness, to find answers. We have come a long way, and we deeply appreciate your assistance. Thank you."

*Kozlov:* "I wish to take a few minutes to share my impressions of the work and our results. I will vouch for what I say here, its accuracy and honor. I believe we have moved substantially since 1992. First, at the present time there are no conditions -- military, political, ideological, economic -- that make it plausible that Americans are or were hidden on the territory of Russia. Second, the law of the Russian Federation allows us, with no loss to state security, to declassify <u>any</u> material or information in existence that is related to U.S. POWs, including materials of the special services. Third, the search of files and the declassification process involves the complex problems of technology and time. Fourth, the political leadership of the USSR understood the political, ideological, and intelligence potential of U.S. POWs; however, the strategic objectives of gathering such information would have been eclipsed by political and ideological goals. Fifth, the transfer to the territory of the former USSR of U.S. POWs would have been impossible for two reasons: first, Vietnam's policy on POWs -- our information here is convincing -- and

the Politburo understood the grave consequences if such an action [interstate transfer of POWs] were taken. Finally, the idea of transport of U.S. POWs to the USSR, either by the military or the special services, would have to have been approved by the Politburo itself. Anything else would have been unthinkable.

"At this time, there is no evidence in Politburo archives that such a decision or action was taken. I categorically refute General Volkogonov's assertion [in the opening Plenary session] that those archives may have been purged of incriminating documents, because there are materials that are much more damning and of greater threat -- such as the Katyn massacre documents, or the Molotov-Ribbentropp agreement materials -- that survived.

"And the character and spirit of your and Senator Smith's questions indicated you agree with the logic of my argument. That is, there can be no U.S. citizens on the territory of the former USSR now, nor transported before. Your questions are well posed regarding contact in Vietnam with Soviet special services' personnel -- well understood. We understand that these questions do not entail peering into state secrets, but are in pursuit of names of your citizens. We understand the thrust of these questions and appreciate your delicacy in raising them. We are ready to verify this version of the session, and we will provide any material in pursuit of this agreement. Thank you for sharing your thoughts with us on these matters."

*Peterson:* "As you spoke I remembered the past, relating to my difficulty in understanding why the former Soviet Union was not firmer with Vietnam."

*Mazurov:* "In what way?"

*Peterson:* "As the graphs showed, things got worse [in terms of cooperation] for you in 1967-1968 than before, because Vietnam did not give you access. In the American mind, we thought that Vietnam was essentially directed to act by Soviet influence. It has been a huge surprise to learn that the relationship was quite different. But while we now understand the difference, we still don't understand why."

*Kozlov:* "Perhaps the confusion lay in your analysis."

*Mazurov:* "As far as I know the CIA had a major mission of sabotaging just that! -- the relationship between Hanoi and Moscow."

[general laugh]

*Peterson:* "This is probably why the Soviet Union would accept a "no" from Vietnam on so many things during the war. That at least is what the document and our analysis seem to show."

*Kozlov:* "As applies to prisoners of war -- yes. Even now Russia doesn't want to embarrass Vietnam needlessly, but <u>of course</u>, relating to the POW question, there is no material that we will hold back. For instance, I have read an unreleased document, a transcription of a three-day meeting between Kosygin, Brezhnev and Pham Van Dong [NVN Premier] around 1972-1973. They talked about everything -- tanks, phosphate plants, rail transportation of supplies -- everything <u>except POWs.</u>"

*Mazurov:* "I suggest you look at <u>your</u> security service documents to discover what drove a wedge between Vietnam and the Soviet Union at that time. Weaver was in the Soviet Union at that time; he was the leading U.S. expert on the Soviet Union, and the desk officer responsible for assessments. I believe you should talk to him! [general laugh] If our security services had anything, you would have gotten it. For instance, General Bakatin, Chairman of the KGB, gave you in 1991 all the information on the bugging of the new Embassy in Moscow; at that time, if Shchebarshin (First Chief Directorate, KGB) had any information on POWs you would have gotten it too. There were U.S. officials at your embassy who spoke regularly to Bakhatin about it in 1991; if we had it, you would have received it."

*Peterson:* "But the *apparat* did not cut him [Bakatin] in on what was held."

*Mazurov:* "That is your opinion."

*Kozlov:* "We need operational data for this. We know now that material went to the Soviet Union; there are some parts with serial numbers and it could be that we also have aircraft numbers. If you can provide us with explicit information on your losses -- aircraft serial numbers, names of crew members -- it could lead to something. Of course there were other sources of equipment, such as the Middle East..."

*Peterson:* "I agree entirely. We will provide more information on each case. Again thanks for the excellent meeting and perhaps we will meet next in Hanoi!!"

*Mazurov:* "Will you provide the aircraft??" [laughter]

The session adjourned.

**Vietnam War Working Group**

**Eighth Plenum of the USRJC for POW/MIA Affairs**

**Action Items and Requests**

Action Items

1. Colonel Mazurov and Colonel Parr will come to an agreement regarding the specific information on individual loss cases that the Russian security services require in order to perform effective and efficient searches. [Minutes, 1-5; Peterson]

2. Colonel Parr and Dr. Kozlov will clarify and commit their consensus in writing regarding the problem of multiplying lists of names, distinguishing which U.S. source lists have been used in which Russian searches (the bases for those searches). [1-5; Peterson/Smith]

3. Russian side will look for contacts and leads connected with the Soviet Red Cross, both for documentary leads in the archives and participants who might have been in North Vietnam and met/heard about U.S. POWs. [2-1; Kozlov]

4. Russian side will verify the existence of questionnaires provided to North Vietnamese personnel for purposes of interrogating U.S. POWs [existence of which was reported by a Russian veteran]. [2-2; Kozlov]

5. Russian side will continue search for documents that provide a more accurate of POW numbers than 1205/735 documents do; those will remain in public forum until supplanted by more accurate contemporaneous material. [2-3; Kozlov]

6. Chief of SVR promised to Kozlov that documents pertinent to the POW issue would be presented before the next Commission Plenum. [2-3; Kozlov]

7. U.S. representatives will visit Briansk PVO museum complex. [2-7; Kozlov]

8. Russian side will clarify the question of the existence of a PVO study, "Materials from the Testimony of American Aviators". [2-7; Kozlov/Mukhin]

9. U.S. side will provide a new detailed list of specific incidents of loss to guide future Russian research **in all sources.** [2-8; Peterson]

Requests

1. From the "41 list" the Russians will provide the source data on names which match discrepancy cases

(in particular, but not only, Mel Holland). [1-5; Smith/Peterson]

2. KGB/GRU holdings, names and dates from: records or general assessment documents, collection requirement documents, POW questionnaires and documents used to assess American POWs, or collection requirements focused on particular information from U.S. POWs.

3. From Ministry of Defense holdings, names and dates from: journals, logs, notes, messages, any communication from advisors/trainers/field activities regarding POW/MIAs, and the daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports of PVO detachments in Vietnam, regarding POW/MIA cases.

4. From Ministry of Foreign Affairs holdings, general information on the international law aspect of the U.S. POW situation during the war, particularly in regard to studies about and advice regarding POWs provided to the North Vietnamese government, such as examining the distinction between POWs and "war criminals", applicability of the Geneva Convention, policy toward international journalists, the role of the International Red Cross, policy toward the Hague International Law Court and the United Nations, in regard to the U.S. POW question during the war.

5. We formally request access to *Putevoditeli* for the various archives, specifically GARF, the Presidential Archives, Podolsk. [2-3; Peterson]

6. We request that the Russian side examine **in all sources** the material they hold on all shoot-downs that occurred on 23 August 1967, so as to evaluate the potential to resolve individual cases by this new method of research. [2-5; Peterson]

7. We request that the Russian side continue to encourage and urge witnesses to speak to the Commission, in particular Amirov. [2-7; Peterson]

8. We request access to known daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports from Soviet PVO units stationed in North Vietnam. [2-8; Peterson]

**MINUTES OF THE CLOSING PLENARY SESSION Eighth Plenum of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs Wednesday, 2 March 1994**

The session convened at 08:30 a.m. in the Pentagon, Room 1E801, Conference Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

*Volkogonov:* "According to our tradition, the Russian side chairs the final session and I have the following proposal: We will now listen to the reports from the heads of the working groups from both the Russian and American side s. They will tell us of the results of their work and their suggestions for future work. Then, perhaps, we shall listen to the brief statements of the Co-Chairmen and decide when our next session is to take place. If this is agreeable, then perhaps we can begin?"

*Toon:* "Yes."

*Volkogonov:* "I would like to ask Congressman Johnson to give his assessment on the Korean War session."

*Johnson:* "Thank you. The Korean War working group had a successful, useful and productive meeting. The U.S. side raised a number of issues it would like addressed by the Russian side. The Russian side, in turn, shared their insights and perceptions from documents from their archives relative to the Korean War. The Russian side turned over several documents that promise to be helpful to the U.S. side in resolving outstanding POW/MIA cases. The Ministry of Defense archives have been especially helpful.

"Colonel Mukhin, with Colonel Orlov's concurrence, summarized the tasks that still need to be addressed as follows: 1) The Russian side would allow a representative of Task Force Russia to view four fonds that we listed which contain information which was provided to us at this meeting by Colonel Orlov.

2) The Russian side would allow Task Force Russia to examine periodic and final operational reports of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps and the Air Force Main Staff reports as appropriate. In addition, the Russian side also agreed to continue to search archival holdings for additional interrogation protocols and materials not only for pilots, but also for ground forces and naval forces that may have been involved.

3) The Russian side will provide access to the reports of Soviet pilots from the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.

4) The Russian side will provide documents on how captured U.S. aircraft were transported from Korea to the USSR.

5) The Russian side will provide access to Task Force Russia to the reports of anti-aircraft divisions and formations in Korea and China.

6) The Russian side will search Russian archives for documents relevant to General Shtykov and Lieutenant General Razuvaev during the course of their tenure in Korea.

7) The Russian side will search their archives for information on the four individuals that Colonel Derskii claims to have had contact with: Sirnin, Reeves, Morris and Wood.

8) The Russian side said it will raise with General Kalinin the issue of the status of research in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] archives, to include specifically the Cecil Stoner case or leads and information relative to American POWs.

9) The Russian side will further investigate the case discussed in *lzvestiia* of the shoot-down of Ray Edward Wells and, in particular, the other two crew members that were not named. We did provide those names to the Russian side.

"The U.S. side, in an effort to assist the Russian side, provided copies of its talking points to the Russian side. The U.S. side has also provided a full list of Air Force Korean War POW/MIAs with shoot-down dates. The Russian side has agreed to compare this data with their information.

"The U.S. side has not had a chance to evaluate fully the material passed to us, but we are optimistic that it will prove valuable. Meanwhile, we eagerly await any new material provided and promised by the Russian side for the next plenary session. We look forward to our continued progress."

*Volkogonov:* "Thank you. I would now like to call on Professor Orlov."

*Orlov:* "My work has been made easier because much has already been said by Congressman Johnson.

"During our meetings, we came to the conclusion that recently we've improved our mutual cooperation in our work between sessions.

"In this session, we passed to the American side a number of new documents from fonds which had previously not been accessed. We believe that indirect material which may be of interest to us may be held in documents of the Air Force Main Staff, of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, and also of aviation and air defense divisions which were a part of that corps.

"We agreed that in the near future we will give the American side, the representatives of which are in Moscow [Task Force Russia], the opportunity to look at the reports of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.

"We will concentrate our future work on several issues, such as how were F-86 aircraft delivered to Moscow. As it stands now, we do not have any documents on this matter, but we will exert every effort to find out.

"The American side then posed several questions which we must look into in the near future: the

activities of Ambassadors Shtykov and Razuvaev in Korea and the names mentioned by Colonel Derskii in his interview with the American side. Although, I must say, I've seen the tapes of the interviews of Colonel Derskii and these names are not mentioned.

"We also asked, at the request of the American side, our colleague General Kalinin to clarify the details of the transport of deserter Cecil Stoner. General Kalinin kindly agreed to help us in this matter.

"At the same time, in the two years of the Commission's work, we came to the conclusion that there cannot possibly be thousands of American POWs who were transported to the Soviet Union. We, of course, cannot completely rule out that several individual persons may have been brought to the Soviet Union. But, to date we have not been successful in finding documents to support this.

"We welcome Congressman Johnson's proposal to broaden our search, to look not only for pilots, but to begin searching for Army and Navy prisoners. However, one condition is needed, namely the desire of the U.S. Navy to cooperate with us in this matter. If we have the same amount of cooperation as we do with the U.S. Air Force, then they will provide us with lists by which we may check and verify our information. We need these lists from the Army and Navy.

"In conclusion I would like to say that we are extremely grateful to Congressman Johnson and our other American colleagues for the atmosphere of goodwill and trust which we had during our session.

"Lastly, I would like to note the great contribution General Volkogonov and Colonel Mukhin have made to our working group."

*Volkogonov:* "Thank you, Professor Orlov."

*Toon:* "I would like to put a question to Colonel Orlov. Were you talking about the American Navy and the American Army when you said you needed their cooperation?"

*Orlov:* "Yes. If we have lists of pilots and servicemen of the Air Force, then we have a complete understanding on the numbers and names and we will only have to confirm this information. We do not have these lists from the Army and Navy. We do not have names to search for. We just have a general list of 3000 persons without division by branch of service. Since that time, we have clarified [reduced] the number of Air Force servicemen. We have not done this for the Army and Navy."

*Johnson:* "Our side will work on trying to achieve a list of that nature with more detail and information. We're not sure that we can come up with it, but we are attempting to make that effort now.

"While I am at it, I forgot to mention the great help from people on our side, Steve in particular. I think that the entire Task Force was able to make great headway due to the ability on both sides."

*Toon:* "I would like to make one brief comment about the Rand Corporation study. We had sent you a copy of this study. The study was given some publicity in the United States. I just want you to know, General, that we do not necessarily subscribe to all the conclusions reached in that study. I speak particularly in the statement that perhaps 50 or a little bit more than 50 American POWs were transferred to Soviet soil. When we finish our analysis of this study, we will be in touch with you."

*Volkogonov:* "I have two very brief comments to make. Professor Orlov did not reproach you; he simply stated that he wishes that you could provide a list to help make the work of the Commission more successful.

"Second, we are acquainted with the Rand study and we think there is much valuable information contained in it. However, on par with this, there are many dubious pieces of information. For example, I cannot agree with the *Kommersant* correspondent Pankov who stated that the Russian side of the delegation only passes documents to the American side for money. For such a prestigious organization as the Rand Corporation to use the immoral comments of Pankov and to cite them in such a serious report is

unwise. We will just consider this a small misunderstanding."

*Toon:* "That's why I wanted to make clear to you, General, that we do not agree with everything in that report."

*Volkogonov:* "All right, we will consider this matter closed. If there are no objections, we will move on to the Vietnam War working group and I will ask Congressman Peterson to speak."

*Peterson:* "Thank you, General. I appreciate the opportunity to report on our series of meetings. The Vietnam working group had a very productive set of meetings, perhaps the most productive to date. We attempted to narrow our focus of investigation, and we established four main issues as the core substance of the Vietnam question. Our investigation focused on:

1) the question of transfer of U.S. POWs to the former Soviet Union,

2) Soviet access to U.S. POWs during the Vietnam War,

3) information in Russian archives and from witnesses of Soviet knowledge of the overall situation regarding prisoners in North Vietnam,

4) information in Russian archives and from witnesses of Soviet knowledge of information on specific cases of losses from Southeast Asia.

"Both sides feel that the work of the Vietnam group is well-defined by these questions. Progress will be measured in accomplishments and not in time.

"We have already discovered much about these four questions. Our investigations in the future will fill out the voids.

"Analysis of the materials passed by the Russian side in September and December has been completed. The results provide a good picture about what the Soviet government did and did not know about U.S. POWs. This work will be expanded in the next few months in an effort to focus work on an acquisition of Soviet incidental information to expand American knowledge on specific cases of loss.

"New initiatives will be undertaken for U.S. analysts to support SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] efforts to conduct a thorough record check of former Soviet intelligence holdings in search of trace data on fates of U.S. missing personnel. Recent access to GRU information is unprecedented. New initiatives have been undertaken to explore information that again reflects on specific instances of loss. The Russian side has presented new information on parts and component remains of aircraft being transported to the Soviet Union. The Russian side will soon present photographs with serial numbers of equipment from aircraft in Russian design bureaus, and cases will be individually investigated for information on the fate of pilots involved in the downed aircraft. The work in this area will be enhanced by scheduled visits to PVO [anti-air defense] museums and perhaps design bureaus.

"I'm not reporting on the detailed aspects of our talks. We will provide the Russian side with a very specific list of requests before your team departs Washington. We will also outline the tasks that have been assumed by the American side.

"I think that both sides agree that the Vietnam working group is at a high point of its work. Both sides are committed to achieving everything possible within the realm of the Joint Commission's charter.

"I want to comment on the very high professional regard in which I hold Mr. Kozlov and Mr. Mazurov and their participation in the Commission's work. We've established a high level of rapport and trust and confidence with one another. We have an opportunity to break new ground as we investigate the Vietnam issue within the Commission. I want to thank my assistant, Nick Pokrovsky, who had worked very diligently to put the Commission's work in a form that was agreeable to both sides. We look forward to

our work between the sessions and also to the May plenary session."

*Volkogonov:* "Thank you. Are there any questions? Then I would like to ask Professor Kozlov to speak."

*Kozlov:* "Thank you. It will be hard for me to add to Congressman Peterson's detailed and exhaustive report. I will just emphasize certain issues.

"I think that it would not be wise to say that we've reached a high point in our work. I believe that we're not at a high point, but it's still a difficult climb to the zenith which still lies ahead.

"The working group has summarized the work carried out since September of last year and has noted several promising directions. We've agreed that our work with U.S. POWs has reached some significant success. From the Russian side 's point of view, this success can be understood in the following manner:

"We have achieved a new level of understanding of the problem and reached a certain depth of the problem. On the one hand, the character, spirit and tone of Congressman Peterson's impressive report and of the esteemed Senator Smith's questions allowed us to conclude that overall they have accepted the conclusions and logic from the September report that can be put in this way: today on the territory of the former USSR, there are no living U.S. citizens who participated in the Vietnam War and such citizens were not brought to the USSR from Vietnam. But on the other hand, both Congressman Peterson and Senator Smith justly and with basis stated that Soviet special services, military services, technical services could have had contact with U.S. POWs on the territory of Southeast Asia. This means that the names of U.S. citizens may have been recorded within the framework of these contacts. We understand and accept this type of discourse. We fully understand the hidden concerns for this and, at the same time, we highly value the delicacy with which these questions were posed by the American side.

"The Russian side announced its readiness to verify this information and to provide any information that may arise as a result. In any case, today it is clearly evident that equipment, weapons, and various parts and components of U.S. aircraft and weapons were transferred to the territory of the Soviet Union for study. We presently have material concerning this and we requested that the American side provide us with a list of names of American MIAs from Vietnam along with the serial and combat numbers of their aircraft.

"We have achieved a very important agreement in regards to the technology of our future work together, as the Congressman reported. I would like to underline the impressive analysis done on the graphs by Mr. Pokrovsky. This gave a special impetus to the work of our group. I must say that his analysis, including his hypotheses concerning contacts, direct and indirect, between Soviet specialists and American POWs, it seemed to us were very convincing. However, the rough analysis of his analysis, which we were able to do yesterday, in general confirms the idea which we stated that perhaps Soviet specialists had a great amount of difficulty in gaining access to American POWs.

"In order to establish conclusively the extent to which the GRU document will help us to resolve the fate of American POWs, we agreed to the necessity to receive the primary documents which were used as a basis for that study. Moreover, as a trial balloon, we agreed to receive primary documents concerning the episodes of 3 to 4 American aircraft shot down on the 23rd of August, 1967. We hope that by the time we meet again in Moscow, we will have partially realized the work which we have agreed to. Thank you."

*Volkogonov:* "Are there any questions for Mr. Kozlov?"

*Peterson:* "I made a statement in jest at the closing of our working group meeting. After thinking about it, I think that at some juncture it makes great sense for us to have a Vietnam War working group meeting in Hanoi. I think that it is something, General Volkogonov, that we might want to investigate as a real possibility.

*Toon:* "I think we ought to look into that. My own feeling is that the Vietnamese will not be too enthusiastic. But, not everything that we do should be designed to please the Vietnamese.

"I have one question for Mr. Kozlov. You made a statement about the fact that there are no Americans who were associated with the Vietnam War now in Russia. Does that mean that during the Vietnam War, no American military personnel who were opposed to the war ever asked for political asylum? And if anybody requested such asylum, what happened to them?"

*Kozlov:* "Mr. Ambassador, first I would like to clarify my statement. I could not say that now on the territory of Russia there are no Americans who had some relation with the Vietnam War. In my report, I spoke about American MIAs from Vietnam. This is because I cannot exclude the possibility that today some Soviet spy is living in Russia who worked in the United States and was assigned to Vietnam.

"As far as American citizens who, while in Vietnam, requested political asylum, today we can only speak of those 6 or 11 U.S. citizens who deserted from Vietnam and were transferred through Japan to the Soviet Union and then to Sweden, and so forth. In any case, I cannot say right now whether there were such requests. It seems very clear to me that if there was such a request, then it would have been discussed at the highest level of government leadership. As I spoke about with Congressman Peterson yesterday, all the material looked at so far indicates that there were no such appeals; however, unfortunately we have not completed our examination.

"I would very much like to support the comment made by Congressman Peterson which he made yesterday and today. I think that in principle it is very important to admit, as the Congressman stated, that the establishment of an American representation in Hanoi would be the best way to resolve cases of American MIAs from the Vietnam War. Of course, this does not mean that work in the Russian direction should not be intensified."

*Volkogonov:* "I would just like to add a few words. I've always believed, and have stated many times, that the key to this issue can be found in Hanoi. I agree fully with Congressman Peterson and would only add that the document which the Russian side provided to the U.S. side is genuine and reflects the actual state of affairs that existed at that time.

"Now, we will ask Mr. Clift to report on the Cold War working group."

*Toon:* "Before that, General, I would like to make a comment. We do have at the present time a ten-man team in Hanoi focusing on the POW problem. It is a military team, supplemented from time to time with additional personnel. I just wanted to clarify that point.

*Clift:* "Thank you, General Volkogonov.

"I'm pleased to report that the working group on Cold War incidents is continuing to realize progress. Our Russian colleagues -- General Kalinin, General Volkov, Colonel Osipov -- bring a very positive approach to this work; they are searching for answers with us. Their work in Russian archives has produced important new documents relating to certain incidents: additional documents, for example on the 1950 shoot-down; our first documents including a report to the Central Committee on the 1965 shoot-down; and in the course of our work, we have confirmed that we will have access to very important archives at the Naval Archives in Gatchina.

"I would note that on the U.S. side, Colonel Semenec, the in-coming head of Task Force Russia, Moscow, participated in our work.

"We reached agreement that we will be allowed to make a color photograph of a very important chart relating to the 29 July 1953 shoot-down. I think the importance of that incident was again underscored to us by the fact that there were 10 family members here, yesterday afternoon and evening, still searching for answers.

"We continue to make progress in our search for the remains of Captain Dunham, lost in October, 1952. A border guards document dating back to 10 October 52 establishes where Captain Dunham was buried on Yurii Island. Our colleague General Volkov reviewed this issue in some detail, noting that we would

have to plan very carefully if we were to try to recover these remains.

"Yesterday afternoon I spoke to the widow and her daughter. They are tentatively of the opinion that we should proceed with an effort to recover Captain Dunham's remains, and they will give us a more definite view in the very near future. With that said, General Volkov reminded us that Yurii Island is subject to *tsunamis* [storms], to typhoons and to rather violent weather and environmental conditions. Once we establish the next-of-kin's desires, the Russian side will send a party to the site identified in the border guard report to see if the grave is still there. I discussed this in the detail I have because our Russian colleagues would hope that we would not build up too high a level of expectation in our press conference today on the recovery of these remains.

"I think that of the greatest importance in our working group sessions this time, we are intensifying our effort to interview eyewitnesses to these shoot-downs. We have a list of some 21 potential witnesses to at least 3 of the shoot-downs, and Colonel Semenec and Colonel Osipov will be pursuing this in Moscow. While we are intensifying our efforts in this new avenue of research, we are realizing perhaps the end of work in other avenues of research. The Russian side has confirmed that they are unable to find additional gun camera photography relating to any of the incidents. They have also underscored the very small chance that we will have to discover KGB cutter logs going back to the 50's and 60's. These were kept for a year or a year and a half, and they simply are not in the central archives.

"I would make two additional points about our work. At the opening of the session, General Kalinin reported on the steps he has taken since December to shape a research program in the detention camps, the prisons, and the psychiatric hospitals of Russia. This goes beyond the Cold War to the broader objectives of our work. It involves five camps, five prisons and eight hospitals. I think it is an important development.

"Finally, during our meetings, the Russian side spent considerable time in our first session providing us with a more detailed statement of the research that they would like us to carry out on their missing: missing from submarine losses; missing in Ethiopia; advisors --civilian and military -- missing in the line of duty abroad during the Cold War; missing in Afghanistan; and, as they put it, missing as a result of the brain drain: the disappearance, for example, of Academician Aleksandrov. I accepted these requests for action by the U.S. side. We will be doing our best to provide answers to these requests.

"In sum, I believe that we have laid out a course of action for our working group which should continue to produce results between now and the May plenary.

"Thank you.

*Volkogonov:* "Thank you. Are there any questions for Mr. Clift? Then I would like to call on Colonel Osipov."

*Osipov:* "Thank you. Esteemed Co-Chairman, esteemed Commission members, I thank Mr. Clift for the high evaluation given to the work on Cold War issues conducted by the Russian side of the Commission. For myself and for my colleagues -- General Kalinin and General Volkov -- I would like to note the atmosphere of goodwill and the high level of productivity in our work during the recent session. I will not speak long because we have very little time left. I will speak only of our 4 main directions and of our work for the future.

"During our work, we spoke of the problems associated with the possible exhumation of Captain Dunham. Mr. Clift spoke about this. We spoke about new documents from 1965 which do not relate to the Russian problem, but may be helpful for the American side. We also spoke of our further work and about those people with whom we should speak in the future.

"During our work, we established that we could consider the incidents of 8 April 1950 in the Baltics and 2 September 1958 in Erevan as settled. However, yesterday's meeting with the family members tells us that the family members still have many questions directed to both the U.S. side and to the Russian side. We

promised the family members that we will continue to work, and, of course, we will do this although I emphasize that the chances of finding anything new on these cases are very small.

"The directions for our work in the near future and for our long-range work:

1) to organize an expedition to Yurii Island to determine the presence of the grave, and at the same time to solve the legal and other problems associated with taking future steps,

2) together with Mr. Semenec and a representative from the working group, to organize visits in any order, at the desire of the American side, and at any time, to any of the five special prisons, of the five special camps, and, making a correction, any of the seven (not eight) psychiatric hospitals..."

*Volkogonov:* "Not because we are hiding one of them."

*Osipov:* "And the most complicated direction,

3) the search for living witnesses of all ten cases of shoot-downs on the territory or in the waters of the Soviet Union.

"Mr. Clift stated that we turned over a list of twenty-one persons concerning three incidents. I believe that if we are speaking about all ten cases, then we will be looking at a list of 100-120 witnesses. The work is very long and complicated, but in our mutual opinion it is probably the only way to resolve outstanding cases, because the possibility for document searches has been practically exhausted.

"In conclusion, I would like to express our deep thanks to Mr. Clift for the attentive way he received our request related to our fellow countrymen, and for his willingness to help. We will be very happy with any results and we are anxiously awaiting these results. Thank you.

*Volkogonov:* "Are there any questions for Colonel Osipov?"

*Toon:* "General, we have coffee outside. Perhaps you would like to call a short break?"

*Volkogonov:* "I do not object, but will we have enough time for the press conference? I believe that you and I will speak for about ten minutes each."

*Toon:* "Yes."

*Volkogonov:* "Then we can break."

[Break]

*Volkogonov:* "I'm afraid that the journalists will be mad if we are late. Ambassador, perhaps you would like to go first?"

*Toon:* "I will go first. General, I will be frank as always. I would like to say, first of all, that I am very pleased with our meetings during the past three days. I am convinced on the basis of our discussions that we enjoy ever greater openness, ever closer ties, and most importantly, ever deeper mutual trust. I think it's fair to say, General, that now after seven meetings, all members of both delegations share a commitment to uncovering the truth about American POWs. And again speaking frankly, just last year, the old Cold Warrior in me would have prevented me from believing that our two countries could enjoy this sort of cooperation.

"We had good reports this morning from the chairmen of our three working groups. I am now convinced that it was an intelligent move on our part to set up these working groups because they provide an effective mechanism for sustaining and deepening our cooperation. Evidence of this cooperation is very useful at this particular time, when the Ames espionage case exploded onto the front pages of American

newspapers. You and I both are not surprised that such activities have continued into the post-Cold War world. You and I both know that all great powers have always and will always seek to be as well-informed about other countries as possible. But I am happy, and I'm sure you are, General, that this stormy episode has not hindered our cooperation. We both know that the Joint Commission's objectives are strictly humanitarian, and our joint efforts should not be affected by other unrelated incidents.

"I would like again to express my gratitude to you, General Volkogonov, for your detailed and extensive answers to questions posed by family members during our lengthy session yesterday. It was an especially difficult afternoon for you; it lasted almost four hours; and most of the questions, understandably, were put to you. It was a very difficult task for you, as well as for Dimitrii, our interpreter. I want to thank you. I understand that the family members with whom you spoke yesterday were deeply impressed by your frankness and your commitment to our humanitarian cause. I have met with them a number of times over the past few years, and I have assured them of my trust in you. Now that they have had a chance to meet you, I am certain that they share my views.

"Finally, General, as to when we should next meet, I would like to suggest that we plan to meet at the end of May/early June. Our Congress will be in recess and our colleagues, Congressmen Peterson and Johnson, will be available. And I can also add that our two Senators, if they are available, should come as they have yet to make a trip with us. I would recommend, General, that we arrive in Moscow on Sunday, May 29; we have plenary sessions on June 1 and 2; and depart on June 4. On this trip, we would like to visit Kazakhstan and Magadan. We can do this at the beginning of our stay or at the end of our stay, depending on what you would prefer."

*Volkogonov:* "Thank you, Ambassador. I always value your frankness. I'm convinced that it is a firm part of your character. I would also like to express my appreciation for the reports of Congressman Johnson, Congressman Peterson and Mr. Clift. I would like to thank our colleagues: Professor Orlov, Professor Kozlov and Colonel Osipov. These reports, presentations and discussions reflect our movement ahead and a definite level of progress.

"I took part in the work of two of the working groups and I was very satisfied. I agree with the conclusion that there are no Americans today being held against their will on our territory. The cases dealing with World War II are practically closed, but there is still much work to be done with the Korean War, the Cold War and the Vietnam War. Yesterday's four-hour long meeting truly showed us just how important the humanitarian aspect of our work is. I would say that your initiative has received a great response throughout the world. As I said before, more that 10 countries have asked for assistance in the search for their own missing citizens. In that we too see how highly valued the long-term commitment to freedom is in the United States.

"I believe that the heads of the working groups reported in sufficient detail about our work. I would just like to say the following:

1) In the archives, we should concentrate first of all on the archives of the Main Staff of the Air Force, on the archives of the Border Troops, and on several regional archives.

2) In reference to what was said by Professor Kozlov, we should expand research of the conditions surrounding the exploitation of captured military hardware in the Soviet Union. We, of course, are not interested in the technical aspects; however, this can provide evidence to the human aspects, the search for people.

3) I believe we should completely resolve those specific issues concerning specific individuals, for example Captain Dunham, Captain Posa, and others. That is to say, intensify this work and dig deeper where there are concrete facts.

4) I believe we should work more with possible eyewitnesses and participants of one or another incident. By our accounts, we have at our disposal the names and addresses of several hundred persons connected with these events. Of course, when looking into this we will find that many have died; but at the same

time, many are still alive.

5) We would like to activate our work in television and in the press. This is the work of the Russian side of the Commission. In particular, the newspapers *Izvestiya* and *Krasnaya Zvezda* have agreed to cooperate with us and to print information that we find.

6) Finally, we agree with you that this work must be continued, within the framework of what is possible, to the complete resolution of all issues. I believe it is possible that still more can be done.

"Lastly, I believe that your proposal to hold the next session at the end of May/the beginning of June is completely acceptable. All issues connected with trips to Kolyma and so forth can be worked through normal channels with Colonel Parr and with Colonel Semenec when he arrives in Moscow.

"I again would like to express my appreciation for the constructive atmosphere here at our session. I hope that the memorandum which we gave you to be passed to Mr. Christopher and Mr. Woolsey will be received in the spirit of friendship and that we will receive answers to our requests. The bell which was raised from the Soviet submarine by the American services has occupied a place of honor in the Military Museum of Russia. We would like to pass to you a fragment from the Lockheed aircraft shot down by a Soviet rocket many years ago as a common memento so that those times will never return. This is a photograph of the rocket, or more precisely the rocket launcher which launched the rocket that brought down the plane."

*Toon:* "Is this the U-2?"

*Orlov:* "Yes. Powers' plane."

*Toon:* "Could we show this at the press conference?"

*Volkogonov:* "Of course. Thank you.

[Meeting adjourns. All move to the press conference.]